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USSR Report

NATIONAL ECONOMY

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6 MARCH 1987

USSR REPORT

NATIONAL ECONOMY

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ECONOMIC POLICY, ORGANIZATION, MANAGEMENT

AGANBEGYAN ELABORATES ON PARTY'S ECONOMIC STRATEGY

Moscow RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNYI MIR in Russian No 6, Nov-Dec 86 pp 42-53

[Article by A.G. Aganbegyan: "The Economic Strategy of the 27th CPSU Congress: Social Aspects"]

[Text] The particular significance of the 27th CPSU Congress lies in the fact that it was held in a stage of history that is a watershed for all of humanity as well as for our own country. The historical uniqueness of the moment was fully and convincingly revealed in the policy report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th party congress. In view of the qualitatively new situation within the country and on the world scene, the congress outlined a thoroughly substantiated course of policy in which the party's new economic strategy is an important component.

The party's line of strategy is primarily contained in the new version of the CPSU Program, which was adopted by the congress. The main conclusions and principles contained in the policy report have been stated at length in the resolution of the congress. The document entitled "Basic Directions of the Economic and Social Development of the USSR Over the Period 1986-1990 and up to the Year 2000," which was adopted by the congress, is another event of exceptional importance.

The party and people are now armed with clear principles and an elaborate program of action. The time has come to transform the large conceptions into concrete deeds.

Raising the Rates of the Country's Socioeconomic Development

The strategy of the Communist Party is the conception of acceleration of the country's socioeconomic development which was adopted by the 27th CPSU Congress. This is a multifaceted conception; it has its qualitative and quantitative aspects, it embraces all the spheres and entities of our society, and above all embraces the economy as the principal field on which the historic battle is being staged for comprehensive and planned improvement of socialism and the gradual transition to communism. In quantitative terms acceleration signifies a turnabout in dynamic behavior, a raising of the growth rates of the principal economic and social indicators.

National income used for consumption and accumulation is the summary indicator of the country's economic development, as is well known. For a number of reasons which have been analyzed in the party documents, the growth rates of the national income have dropped over the last 15 years from 41 percent in the 8th Five-Year Plan to 28 percent in the 9th, 21 percent in the 10th, and 17 percent in the 11th. The growth of all other economic and social indicators has also dropped correspondingly. The conception of acceleration is aimed above all at a substantial increase in the dynamism of our development. The growth rates of the national income are to rise from 17 percent in the 11th Five-Year Plan to 22 percent in the 12th and 28 percent in subsequent 5-year periods so that over the 15-year period remaining up to the year 2000 the size of the national income would almost double. The 12th Five-Year Plan must become the turning point in this regard. It is difficult to overcome all at once the inertia in development of such a gigantic organism as the national economy of our immense country. That is why higher, but relatively moderate rates were adopted for the 12th Five-Year Plan. A most important task in this 5-year period is to create the conditions for achieving a sharp rise in the growth of the national income and other indicators in the 13th and 14th Five-Year Plan.

If the figures given above are converted to indicators of the average annual growth of the national income, then the task of acceleration consists of raising the rates approximately from 3 percent per year in the 11th Five-Year Plan to 4 percent in the 12th and 5 percent or higher in the nineties. Of course, the absolute size of the national income and of other economic and social indicators will increase still more substantially. For instance, the absolute growth of the national income in the 11th Five-Year Plan (between 1980 and 1985) was 71 billion rubles, while in the 12th Five-Year Plan it is 111 billion rubles, which means that it will exceed the 1985 level by a factor of 1.6.

Higher growth rates of development of social production on the one hand allow for fuller satisfaction of people's needs and attainment of a substantial rise in the level of living of the Soviet people, while on the other it is possible to substantially increase the volume of capital investments, which are necessary for the technical transformation of the material base of our society.

Of course, the quantitative side of the program of acceleration is extremely important. But it still does not contain the main component of the party's economic strategy. The main component lies in the new quality of growth, and it is manifested above all in a change in the source of economic development, a change in its structure, a change in the very content of the process of the growth of production.

The New Attribute of Growth--Intensification

The national economy's transition to the strategy of intensification is a most important component of the conception of acceleration of socioeconomic development. Up to now, as is well known, we have been developing with a predominance of extensive factors--by bringing new resources into production: fixed productive capital, capital investments, fuel and raw materials, and manpower. The rise in efficiency of utilization of resources has played a relatively

smaller role among the factors in economic growth. Put more simply, we have been developing predominantly on an input basis. This strategy, as has been demonstrated back at the April (1985) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and at the conference held in June (1985) in the headquarters of the CPSU Central Committee on the problems of acceleration of scientific-technical progress, has no future; it leads the country's economy into a blind alley. The only alternative is for the economy to make the conversion to intensive development, and that requires making the rise in efficiency of social production the main source of development. This is the key problem of our future development, a problem that is aggravated by the objectively manifested trends toward smaller growth of productive resources.

The 9th Five-Year Plan was the last one in our country which showed a large growth of resources. In this respect it was typical of the 20-year period of postwar development (1955-1975). Then the growth of resources began to drop back rapidly. This trend will continue in the 12th and subsequent 5-year plans. In the nineties the growth of productive resources will hardly increase over the 12th Five-Year Plan. And this means that the efficiency of social production will have to rise 20 percent in each 5-year period (28 percent if we look at the growth of the national income) by comparison with 14 percent in the 12th Five-Year Plan and the 7 percent achieved in the 11th Five-Year Plan (see the table).

Dynamic Behavior of Principal Economic Indicators for 5-Year Planning Periods (%)

Indicators (growth shown in %)	5-Year Plans			
	9th	10th	11th	12th
Final results for national income used for consumption and accumulation	28	21	17	22
Productive resources:				
Total--aggregate indicator*	21	13	9	7
Including:				
Fixed productive capital	52	43	37	30
Output of extractive industry	25	10	8	8
Size of labor force in physical production	6	6	2	0
Efficiency of social production:				
Total--aggregate indicator**	6	7	7	14
Including:				
Output-capital ratio	-16	-15	-14	-7
Efficiency of utilization of industrial raw materials	2	10	8	12
Productivity of social labor	21	14	15	22

* The aggregate indicator of productive resources was obtained by converting all forms of productive resources to a single measure using the indicator of the efficiency of their particular forms (much the way capital investments are converted to current outlays using standard rates of efficiency). This conversion is allowed since all forms of resources have a common content--labor, although they are embodied in different forms: in the form of the embodied labor

(Footnote * continued) of the year (output of the extractive industry), live labor, which could be measured by the size of the labor force in physical production.

** Calculated from the indicator of the national income used.

As we see, the task of accelerating the country's socioeconomic development will be performed in the context of a shrinking growth of productive resources. The shrinking of the size of the labor force is related to the demographic consequences of the war and the need for redistribution of personnel into the sectors and branches serving the public, while the reduction of the growth of extraction of fuel and raw materials is related to the deterioration of mining-geological and economic conditions for their extraction, and the reduction of fixed productive capital is related to the slowing down in the previous 5-year planning periods of the dynamic rates of capital investments in production facilities (their growth dropped from 44 percent in the 9th Five-Year Plan to 23 percent in the 10th, and 16 percent in the 11th Five-Year Plan).

To guarantee the acceleration, the efficiency of social production will as it were have to be increased twice: once to offset the shrinking growth of resources and a second time to guarantee the rise of the growth rates of the national income. This will be incredibly difficult to do, since the inertia that has come about in our economy has to be radically broken: the pattern of developing "comfortably" with an ever greater enlistment of resources and a moderate and approximately uniform annual rise of efficiency (an annual average of 1.4 percent). At this point a leap has to be made and the growth rate of efficiency speeded up by a factor between 1.5 and 2. That means that the growth rates of the productivity of social labor have to be raised from 15 percent in the 11th Five-Year Plan to 22 percent in the 12th, i.e., by a factor between 1.3 and 1.4. The measure of conservation of fuel and raw materials has to be raised by a factor greater than 1.5, the yield of the end product per unit of fuel and raw materials has to be raised from 8 percent in the 9th Five-Year Plan to 12 percent in the 12th, and the drop in the output-capital ratio has to be cut in half (from 14 percent to 7 percent).

And all of this has to be done in the very near future--in the years of the 5-year planning period which has now begun. At the same time, we emphasize once again, in those same few years the conditions have to be created and the prerequisites prepared for a still larger rise in efficiency in the 13th and 14th Five-Year Plans. In those 5-year planning periods it will be necessary to achieve an average rise in the productivity of social labor of 30 percent or more, since over the 15-year period as a whole, up to the year 2000, the level of productivity of social labor is to be increased by a factor between 2.3 and 2.5, and the main load falls on the nineties.

Moreover, and this was especially emphasized in the address delivered by N.I. Ryzhkov at the 27th party congress, in the mid-nineties the output-capital ratio in the national economy has to be stabilized, and then its rise has to be achieved. After all, over the coming 15 years as a whole the productive potential is to be augmented in approximately the same proportions as the national income--by a factor of 2. Let us note for sake of comparison that over the previous 15 years the country's productive potential (fixed productive

capital) has tripled while the national income has grown only 80 percent. It is evident from that one comparison how large the qualitative change must be in raising the efficiency of social production. Whereas in the past two-thirds of our economic growth was on the average achieved by a growth of resources, i.e., extensively, and only one-third of it was achieved through intensification, by increasing the efficiency of utilization of those resources, already in the 13th Five-Year Plan there has to be a radical change in that breakdown. The share of extensive factors will drop to almost one-third, and that of intensive factors will take over the dominant place, while in the nineties we must achieve the predominant share of the growth of social production (three-fourths at a minimum) through intensification.

The reader who has managed to break through the fence of figures has already become tired. But there is no other way for an economist to present a documented argument than to rely on statistical data concerning the dynamic pattern of development. Indeed you cannot display plans for the future by counting on your fingers: accurate quantitative indicators are needed; behind them stand qualitative changes: in this case a complete change in the sources and factors of our economy's development.

Let us take the analysis further. There are two ways of achieving a rise of efficiency. The first is by mobilizing organizational, economic, and social potential, by making better use of the existing potential. This source can be activated quickly, and it can be said without exaggeration that it is already working for acceleration. Let us recall the events of the recent past. In the 4th quarter of 1984 and the 1st quarter of 1985 the rates of economic development dropped off substantially. There was, of course, the impact of the harsh winter, but the principal reason for the adverse trends lay in poor organization and a slackening of order and discipline. It should be said that the volume of industrial production in the 1st quarter of 1985 increased only 2 percent over the same period of 1984. Immense efforts were required to prevent this adverse trend from developing, to change the situation. The April (1985) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee called upon the workers to guarantee unconditional fulfillment of the plan, and that meant raising the growth rates of industrial production to 5 percent. As is well known, this was in fact done. For the year as a whole, in spite of the slowdown in the 1st quarter, the growth of industrial output was 3.9 percent, as envisaged by the annual plan, without any sort of adjustment.

The more vigorous effort to use organizational-economic and especially social factors related to human behavior made it possible in the 1st half of 1986 to achieve still more substantial success: industrial production rose 5.6 percent over the corresponding period of last year. I recall nothing like it over the last 8 years! Of course, we should not overestimate the figures for growth rates over half a year. As the saying goes, don't count your chickens before they hatch. But all of these figures, which are substantially higher than those outlined in the plan, indicate immense capabilities for improving the situation. And after all we have touched only on the layer of our untapped potential closest to the surface--all of this was achieved merely through somewhat better organization and a tightening of discipline. We need to call upon such powerful levers as improvement of management, strengthening of

interest in results, and the restructuring of the economic mechanism. Such measures are beginning to be carried out, and the effect from them still lies in the future. But however great these organizational, economic, and social reserves and capabilities, they are still limited, and as they are exhausted, it will be increasingly difficult to maintain the rate that has been adopted. And we need not merely to maintain the rate, but also to increase it! After all, the most important jump is in the future--we have to accomplish it in the nineties. It has to be remembered that that leap can be made mainly by virtue of scientific-technical progress.

If we are to obtain the necessary return here, we have to have prototypes of new technology. We have to produce the new technology in volume and use it in the sectors of the economy. And that takes time and resources.

I will give a concrete example. Hundreds of thousands of 5-ton ZIL trucks are at work on the country's roads. This truck has been in production more than 20 years, it has a 150-HP carburetor engine which on the average burns 28 liters of gasoline to go 100 km. Of course, we should improve the use of these trucks and indeed highway freight transport as a whole; here again there is substantial potential and capabilities for improvement through better repair and servicing of the trucks, better loading, a more economical pattern of driving, etc. Fuel consumption could be reduced somewhat as a consequence. But the major change will occur only when the outdated truck is replaced by the diesel ZIL with a 180-HP engine and a fuel consumption (incidentally, the fuel itself costs only two-thirds as much) of no more than 19 liters for every 100 km. Thanks to its greater power the diesel ZIL pulling a trailer can haul 3 tons more freight than its predecessor; thus fuel consumption per ton of freight carried will be still lower.

But if the benefit to the national economy is to be obtained from the new truck, it is first necessary to carry out complete reconstruction both of the head plant of the AvtoZIL association in Moscow and also of its subsidiaries, which will require more than 2 billion rubles of capital investments and quite a bit of time. This reconstruction project is well under way; by the end of the 12th Five-Year Plan the diesel ZIL's will be part of the general flow of traffic. And the effectiveness of this transition will increase with the years as the diesel trucks replace the previous generations of gasoline trucks. In the nineties, consequently, we will begin to receive a sizable and ever growing return. But the foundation for that return will be laid in the 12th Five-Year Plan.

The situation will also be exactly like that with many other production operations. The country will obtain in the nineties the principal benefit from the acceleration of scientific-technical progress whose prerequisites are being brought about at the present time. That is why higher rates of overall development have been envisaged for the 13th and 14th Five-Year Plans. The scientific-technical components will occupy the principal place in increasing efficiency.

That is the future. But to bring that time closer, we have to multiply our efforts today to carry out the new investment policy and structural policy

that has been proclaimed. The new attribute of growth is also vividly manifested in this.

The new investment policy and structural policy is aimed at bringing about the conditions for large-scale use in the economy of new equipment and technology embodying the highest achievements of science. Here central attention is being shifted to the production of machines, equipment, and instruments for all the other sectors of the economy. Whereas in the 11th Five-Year Plan the volume of capital investments in machinebuilding increased approximately 30 percent, the growth planned in the 12th is 80 percent. Half of the immense capital investments will be committed to technical reconstruction and retooling of machinebuilding enterprises, including the adoption of an advanced metal-working technology here. About 60 percent of all the equipment in machinebuilding today will be replaced at the beginning of the 5-year period, by 1990, with new and more productive and efficient equipment.

The new technical base of machinebuilding will make it possible to accomplish the transition to production of the most up-to-date equipment, so that the bulk of the products machinebuilding is manufacturing today will be replaced by fundamentally new products. The annual renewal of the products of machinebuilding is to be raised to 13 percent by 1990, as against 3.1 percent in 1985. Moreover, the "Basic Directions...", adopted by the 27th party congress, call for the new machines and equipment to have productivity and reliability that is at least 1.5-2-fold higher than those now produced.

We should emphasize that it is not merely a question of making the transition from manufacturing outdated models to production of certain types of new equipment. Interrelated systems of machines and equipment will be produced so that in their mutual linkage they will guarantee the transition in various sectors of the economy to new technological systems with higher efficiency. As machinebuilding undergoes a radical qualitative transformation, the task has been set of raising the rates of development of this leading sector of the economy. In the 11th Five-Year Plan the total volume of output of the machinebuilding complex rose 35 percent, and in the 12th Five-Year Plan it is supposed to increase 43 percent, i.e., 1.9-fold more than in the industrial sector as a whole. This will strengthen machinebuilding's priority positions in the national economy, and the main thing is to put in place a strong foundation for retooling the entire productive plant of the national economy.

The large-scale production of new technology will make it possible to undertake a radical retooling of all sectors of the economy, will make it possible to apply the most advanced technologies. This retooling in the course of technical reconstruction of social production is the strategic line of economic policy. Even in the 12th Five-Year Plan the share of capital investments committed to technical reconstruction and retooling in the USSR economy will increase from 37 percent in 1985 to 50 percent in 1990. In all, technical reconstruction will be allocated 240 billion rubles of capital investments over the next 5 years, i.e., more than has been allocated for those same purposes over the last 10 years. The index of annual retirement of outdated equipment will more than double on the average--rising to 6.2 percent.

The main problem now is to carry out the retooling more rapidly and make the transition to the production and widespread dissemination of new technological systems based on new generations of technology, which guarantee a large leap in production efficiency, sharply raise labor productivity (by factors of 2, 3, or 5), and greatly reduce inputs of fuel, raw materials, and supplies. And all of this will be accomplished mainly without increasing the capital intensiveness of production. This means that paramount attention must be paid to the economic efficiency of the new equipment and technology. Emphasis in selection of progressive technical design features must be placed on their economic efficiency.

In view of the particular importance of the machinebuilding complex to the qualitative transformation of the productive forces of society the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers adopted an elaborate decree in 1985 on the further development of machinebuilding. This document represents in essence the program of the state for lifting up this key sphere of the economy.

The new investment policy and structural policy will bring about a change in the content of each percentage point of growth of our national economy. Whereas now the 3-percent average annual growth of the national income is largely determined by the growth of output of traditional and partially obsolete products, in coming 5-year planning periods the 4-5-percent growth will be related above all to a sharp increase in the output of qualitatively new products which are more efficient and productive. We have already spoken about rapid replacement of outdated products of machinebuilding. The same thing will be taking place in other sectors, especially in the chemical industry. As is well known, a comprehensive program has been adopted for chemicalization of the economy. Even during the 12th Five-Year Plan the volume of output of chemical products is to increase 33 percent; that is, it is to grow 1.5-fold faster than the social product as a whole.

While the planned increase in the volume of industrial output during the 12th Five-Year Plan is 25 percent, the share of industrial products in the superior-quality category will double. Thus intensification on the basis of broad utilization of advances of the scientific-technical revolution is the principal condition for the new attribute in the growth of the Soviet economy.

Social Factors as the New Attribute of Growth

Another exceedingly important characteristic of the new attribute of growth is its social orientation. On the basis of acceleration of the country's socioeconomic development a sharp change of direction will be accomplished in economic development toward solving social problems and above all toward increasing the well-being of the people and strengthening the socialist way of life. The most acute and baneful social problems are to be solved first of all.

The most important of these problems is to improve the diet of the population; the growth rates of agricultural production are to be more than doubled to achieve that end. Whereas in the 11th Five-Year Plan the volume of agricultural output was 6 percent higher than in the 10th, in the 12th Five-Year Plan

this indicator has been adopted at the level of 14.4 percent, which exceeds the growth rates of agriculture in the 9th (13 percent) and 10th (9 percent) Five-Year Plans.

Achievement of the goals which have been set requires a thorough restructuring of the entire agroindustrial complex. This restructuring has already begun and will be continued. It is a question of broad application of intensive agrotechnologies, of a transition to a fundamentally new structure in management of the agroindustrial complex, and of introducing here a new economic mechanism that is in keeping with the new tasks.

Another exceedingly important task is to saturate the consumer market with a broad assortment of high-quality goods and a wide variety of services. A specific comprehensive program for production of consumer goods and development of the service sphere has been adopted for that purpose. It calls for accelerated development of these branches and sectors. For example, in the 11th Five-Year Plan light industry increased its volume of production by 8 percent, but in the 12th these rates will more than double. On the whole the production of nonfood goods will increase 35 percent over the 5-year period. Moreover the output of durable consumer goods and housewares will increase 1.5-fold. The volume of paid services to the public will increase 50 percent, and at the same time their quality and the way in which they are provided will be improved.

But principal attention will be paid not to quantitative indicators, but to updating the assortment and quality of consumer goods. Higher requirements are being imposed in this connection on machinebuilding branches--they must deliver the most up-to-date equipment for the production of consumer goods; and they are also being imposed on the chemical industry--it is required to deliver high-quality materials. The expansion of cooperation with the socialist countries is also operating in the same direction. Leading foreign firms are being enlisted in the production of high-quality consumer goods. In order to put an end to the serious gap that now exists between the production of goods for the population and the real demand, in order to avoid "production of goods to go on the shelf," which means that a large volume of unsold goods have to be discounted, there has to be a radical change in the economic relations between the public, the trade sector, and the producers of consumer goods. A decision has been taken to restructure the economic mechanism in light industry: there has to be a sharp restriction on the number of binding targets imposed on enterprises in that sector. Their plan will be shaped on the basis of contracts with organizations in the trade sector, and the latter must in turn be responsible for the conformity of their orders to public demand. Intersector production and industrial trade associations are to be created to manufacture and sell the goods of light industry and to expand trade through manufacturers' outlets. The new economic mechanism, which is aimed at satisfying the real demand of the public, is being introduced in the trade sector as well.

Much attention will be paid to providing housing to the public. Over the past 15 years about 1.5 billion m² of housing floor space, or approximately 30 million housing units, have been introduced in the USSR. Over the next 15 years,

along with the general improvement in the quality and comforts of the housing produced, plans call for building more than 2 billion m² of housing, or 40 million housing units. As the calculations show, this will be sufficient to perform the task which has been set forth by the party: providing every Soviet family a separate apartment or house with conveniences by the year 2000. But this will require a solid increase in the volume of housing construction, which in recent 5-year planning periods has held steady at a level of 500-550 million m². In the 12th Five-Year Plan housing is to be built with a total area of 595 million m², and at the same time a mighty construction capability is to be developed for housing construction so that in the 13th and 14th Five-Year Plans more than 700 million m² will be activated in each 5-year period.

Among the social problems particular importance is attributed to changing the content of the labor of the Soviet people, to making it more attractive and creative, to eliminating heavy, monotonous, and uninteresting work. Plans to that end call for sharply reducing the use of manual labor. At present about half of all the workers and kolkhoz members in the economy are employed at manual labor. By the year 2000 their share must be reduced to 15-20 percent; in other words the number of workers employed at manual labor will be reduced by a factor of 2.5-3. In order to illustrate how formidable a task this is, we should mention that over the last 15 years the number of workers doing manual labor has been reduced by a factor of approximately 1.2. It is clear that such a program requires purposive activity toward full mechanization and automation of production. Even in the 12th Five-Year Plan, for example, the level of automation of industrial production must double. Measures related to the organizational development of production, more intensive specialization, and concentration of auxiliary production operations will also be aimed in that direction.

The creative character of the work of engineers and employees will be sharply increased on the basis of widespread use of computers and automated systems based on computers. Thanks to development of the service sphere, the trade sector, the food service industry, and growth of sales of up-to-date household appliances there must be a substantial reduction in the amount of work in the household, so that the free time of the workers is increased thereby. This free time can be effectively used to raise the general educational, vocational, and cultural level of people and to bring up children. The reform of the general public school, which is aimed at combining learning with work, and the upcoming radical restructuring of the system of higher and secondary specialized education will create conditions for shaping a new type of worker who is more fully in keeping with the present stage of development of social production.

Thus the qualitative transformation of the productive forces of our society, their rise to a new and higher level, will be accomplished as it were by a two-horse team: on the one hand by the retooling of production, which requires a more qualified worker, and on the other by the greater exactingness of the workers themselves toward production, which has been brought about by their higher education and culture. In the final analysis this must result in performance of the programmatic task advanced by V.I. Lenin and set forth in the new version of the CPSU Program concerning achievement in the USSR of the world's highest level of labor productivity.

Along the Road Toward Radical Reform of Management

The new tasks of socioeconomic development call for a thorough restructuring of the system of planning and management and of the entire economic mechanism. The policy report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th congress stated: "The situation is such at the present time that it is not possible to limit ourselves to partial improvements--a radical reform is indispensable." (Footnote) ("Materialy XXVII syezda KPSS" [Materials of the 27th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1986, p 33) It is a question of creating an integral, efficient, and flexible system of management that makes it possible to realize more fully the advantages of the socialist form of economic activity.

The materials of the 27th party congress provide thorough substantiation of the tasks and basic directions for restructuring of the economic mechanism. As in any task, the first thing that has to be done is to clearly state the goals which are being advanced for the new system of economic activity and management. First, this system must in fact subordinate our entire production to the needs of society and to satisfying people's needs. This means that we must put an end to the dictate by the producer and his dominance over the consumer, eliminate the shortage, and see that the supplier's work is brought into accurate conformity with the requirements and interests of the consumer. If this is done then the needs of society can be satisfied with smaller resources. After all, today resources are often consumed to no purpose: many products which in fact are unnecessary are being produced, and they either stand idle, like a substantial portion of machine tools or trucks, or they gather dust in warehouses, depots, and stores, which is what happens to inventories of materials. As the scale of production has grown, this problem has become ever more acute and has taken on immense significance. Over the last 10 years, for example, physical working capital has been growing considerably faster than the gross social product and has greatly exceeded the standard allowances. The immense amount of equipment that is idle or is poorly used has brought about a substantial drop in the output-capital ratio.

The second basic purpose of the reform of management, which is inseparably bound up with the first, consists of orienting the entire system of economic activity toward increasing efficiency and raising quality, toward acceleration of scientific-technical progress. The results of production need to be evaluated for that purpose, above all from the standpoint of the national economy. And this can be done only if the price system is brought into line with socially necessary expenditures and if prices take into account the efficiency of products from the standpoint of the national economy. That accounts for the importance of full accounting of costs, not merely direct costs, which are clearly visible, but also the costs that occur in other units of the economy and are related, say, to bringing more expensive resources into production, to engaging additional capital investments. But this full accounting of costs is possible, in our view, only if a charge is introduced on all types of resources. In this case appreciation of the full result of the producer's activity from the standpoint of the national economy and its comparison to the full costs will yield a real resulting indicator and will make it possible to judge production efficiency objectively. We will add that this is an indispensable, but still not sufficient condition for the fault-free operation of the economic

mechanism. It is insufficient because direct relations have to be established between the results of the activity of the enterprise, of the relevant work collective on the one hand, and the remuneration of its work, its incentives, the cultural and consumer service benefits which the collective has earned on the other.

The situation has to be brought about in the new economic mechanisms so that it is not society as a whole, personified by the state, that is accountable for the inefficient operation of some particular work collective, but rather that collective itself would be accountable for its failure to utilize untapped potential and opportunities. And conversely: additional resources obtained through strenuous work of a given collective must to a considerable extent be left to the collective and must encourage it to improve its operation further. At the present time, as is well known, that does not exist. What after all happens? Better performance need not by any means be rewarded by higher wages, better housing supply, and so on. Since planning is mostly based on the level attained, the best results often seem to be dissolved in the average, and reliable suppliers face ever higher targets, they are granted a smaller growth of wages for every percentage point of the rise of labor productivity, there is little incentive for additional reduction of inputs of fuel and materials, and there is no incentive whatsoever for economical use of fixed productive capital. We have to realize that those who are working on two shifts are from the standpoint of living conditions in a worse position than collectives working on one shift. And examples of that kind are not taken into account. This situation must be radically altered. And the principle that should govern that change is as clear as it can be: whoever achieves better results must also have better remuneration.

And finally, the third direction in the revamping of the system of economic activity and management is the development of economic democracy, involving the workers in management, stimulating initiative and socialist enterprise. The aim of the 27th party congress of setting up councils of work collectives has immense importance to performing these tasks; those councils will be able to exercise more effectively the rights of work collectives envisaged by the relevant law.

As we see, restructuring in this area is multilevel in nature. Such a radical reform of management cannot, of course, be carried out all at once in the form of a campaign. It is a rather complicated process requiring thoughtful and systematic effort over a number of years. This effort has already begun. As they become ready, bodies of management of groups of interrelated branches are being created so as to take into account their specific nature. These include Gosagroprom, the Bureau for Machinebuilding, and the new Gosstroy. A proposal was also made at the congress concerning joint management of the group of transportation ministries.

The new conditions of economic activity introduced at the beginning of 1984 in a small group of ministries by way of a large-scale experiment are now being applied in a more elaborate form in every other industrial enterprise, and beginning in 1987 they will be extended to the industrial sector as a whole. In our view the large-scale experiment being conducted cannot be given an unmixed

evaluation. It was conceived in the right direction, since it provides an orientation toward a broadening of the rights and independence of production associations and enterprises. On the whole its results can be judged constructive: there has been improvement in fulfillment of the delivery plan, the growth rates of labor productivity have risen somewhat, and production cost has begun to drop more rapidly. But this shift in efficiency and quality has not as yet been radical. In the final analysis it has to do with the fact that the economic conditions introduced in the course of the experiment are not what you would call a radical reform. That is, this experiment was conceived in 1983 under different conditions, when the task of accelerating the country's socioeconomic development, the task of qualitative transformation of social production, of a radical acceleration of scientific-technical progress, had not been set with full urgency. That is why the conditions of the experiment turned out to be halfway measures. The independence of enterprises, their rights, were broadened, but not as substantially as is required. In a number of cases petty meddling into the affairs of enterprises and production associations persisted, often many previous instructions and regulations that stood in the way of initiative and enterprise remained in effect. In this situation the conditions for economic activity proved to be detached from the collective forms of the organization of work and work incentives, and little that was new was instilled into the organization of material and technical supply, yet this is a vitally important sphere to enterprises, the sphere that is doing most to restrict their initiative and creativity. Nor were enough incentives introduced for stimulating quality and technical innovation. In 1985 these incentives were strengthened, but they did not remain among the mandatory conditions of the experiment. This precisely accounts for the notable success in the work of enterprises which made the conversion to the conditions of the experiment, on the one hand, and on the other it accounts for a certain disappointment with the results of the experiment on the part of many economic specialists.

Of course, the results achieved did vary. Wherever the new conditions of economic activity were perceived with authentic creativity and energetic action was taken, as, for example, in the light industry of Belorussia, the shift in productivity and in the quality of the product produced proved to be far more appreciable than in many other places. In any case, the economic conditions of the experiment still have not placed work collectives before the rigid dilemma: either work better and live better or work in the old way and live poorly. At present even those who do not roll up their sleeves are getting along alright. And many prefer this strategy. In 1985 those enterprises which had been working under the conditions of the experiment for a 2d year performed worse in the last part of the year than in the 1st year, when they enjoyed additional benefits related to supply, transportation services, and when more attention was paid to them.

That is why a continuing search is being made in industry for more effective forms of economic activity. A great importance is being attributed in this connection to the experiment conducted at VAZ and the Sumy Machinebuilding Association, which have converted to self-financing on the basis of standard distribution of profit, combined with the granting of broader independence and rights and with the simultaneous increase in their responsibility for the end

results. Beginning in 1987 associations and enterprises of two ministries (petroleum and chemical machinebuilding and instrumentmaking) and several dozen large associations in other sectors will be converted to the system of self-financing.

There have been interesting results from another experiment with the conversion of 46 shops and sections at Novosibirsk enterprises to collective forms of the organization of work and work incentives; in addition to the workers, engineering and technical personnel were also included in these collective forms. Here a more radical shift took place. The productivity of labor in those shops and sections rose 14 percent during the year of the experiment, which is 2.5-3-fold more than in past years and also by comparison with analogous shops and sections not converted to these conditions. Wherever things were set up competently and knowledgeably, there was literally an explosion of people's initiative and work activity. Labor productivity rose 25-30 percent for the year. It is evident that closer attention has to be paid to the principles of the collective contract. As the radical reform in economic activity is accomplished, perhaps it would be advisable to make these principles the basis of the entire incentive system. At present the experience of a few enterprises and organizations entirely converted to the collective contract confirms such a conclusion. There has already been talk in the press about the amazing results achieved in conversion to the collective contract of primary construction organizations--multipurpose flowlines for the construction of gas pipelines. This experience needs to be tried in a number of industrial enterprises as well, for example, in underground mines, in timbering and lumbering operations, where it is simpler to evaluate the results, and then at enterprises of other branches as well.

The transition now being made from the three-tier to predominantly two-tier system of management has great importance in restructuring the system of management of the industrial sector. This effort is being actively carried on in machinebuilding ministries, where most of the all-union industrial associations (the middle tier of management) have been eliminated, and the production associations and enterprises have been made directly subordinate to the ministry's central headquarters. This restructuring of the system of management organically incorporates the formation of new production associations and the transfer of additional enterprises under those associations that are operating efficiently.

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of the tasks set at the June (1985) Conference in the headquarters of the CPSU Central Committee concerning the integration of science and production in the branches of industry. A sizable portion of branch institutes, which existed in isolation from production, while many of them did not even have design offices and workshops, are now being transferred to scientific-production and production associations. New scientific-production associations are being formed; each of them must become an outpost of scientific-technical progress in its branch. To be specific, plans call for creating 150 new scientific-production associations in machinebuilding.

Exceptional results have been achieved since introduction of the new economic system, as was stated at the congress, on the Belorussian Railroad, where during the year they managed to eliminate 12,000 work positions and raised labor productivity during that same year as much as it was raised in that sector over the entire 5-year period. Now this experience has been extended to 10 other railroads. In our view very important results have also been achieved during the experiment in 10 trucking enterprises in RSFSR, where they put an end to padding, and motor transport personnel turned toward better service to their customers. The quality of service rose during the year of the experiment, and fuel consumption dropped 18 percent. To be sure, in a number of cases the statistical indicators of utilization of the fleet dropped off in those enterprises, but there is nothing surprising in that; after all, the real report data were obtained for the year of the experiment, while in past years these figures were arrived at on the basis of padding. Maritime transport will be converted to the new economic conditions in 1987.

A decision has been adopted to reorganize the management of the USSR's construction complex (conversion to the regional principle of management of general construction organizations) and beginning in 1987 to introduce here the new economic mechanism, which is oriented toward stimulating a shortening of construction time, activation of projects already under construction, increased efficiency, and higher quality of construction.

An experiment is also being conducted in the sphere of consumer services. In Estonia new forms of contract relations between repair people and manufacturers of television sets are making it possible to give people a substantial interest in the results of their work, and this has brought about a fuller satisfaction of the needs of customers for these services.

At the same time a large-scale preparatory effort is being made for radical restructuring of the entire system of prices, the finance-and-credit mechanism, for development of wholesale trade and direct relations between enterprises instead of centralized resource allocation of the means of production. This effort, of course, requires quite a bit of time, especially to work out and introduce the new price list. This preliminary restructuring of the basic economic levers is a most important step in the transition from the predominance of administrative to economic methods of management, and it will bring about conditions for further expansion of the independence and rights of production associations and enterprises, while at the same time they will become more responsible for the end results of their activity.

Expanding the independence of the lower-level production units--associations, enterprises, kolkhozes, and sovkhozes, and other economic organizations--and the transition to economic methods require a new approach to the conduct of centralized management. There must be substantial changes in the content and functions of the work done by ministries of branches and sectors: the center of operational and everyday economic activity is being shifted to the associations and enterprises, and the ministries are being transformed into economic-planning and scientific-technical staff headquarters of their respective branches and sectors. Planning work is undergoing substantial change--scientific-technical progress is becoming the load-bearing element of the plan;

economic norms are being disseminated ever more widely instead of mandatory targets specifically addressed to those who are to achieve them (this has already been done with respect to planning the wage fund). Indicators of efficiency and quality are being moved into the foreground, priority is being given to the social breakdown of the plan, a more exacting approach is being taken to the balance of the economy, to the regional aspect of planning, and so on. Central authorities are giving up petty meddling with units at the lower level and are concentrating more on solving the strategic and intersector problems of the future. The task now is to concretize these directions and gradually make the transition to an integral system of management that will guarantee performance of the tasks advanced by the party to accelerate the country's socioeconomic development.

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AGRO-ECONOMICS, POLICY, ORGANIZATION

PRIVATE PLOT INCOME QUESTION EXAMINED

Readers' Letters, Ryazan Reaction

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Jan 87 p 2

[Readers' responses to two previous IZVESTIYA articles, under the rubric "Readers' Opinions: For, Against, and Particular Views: "Strong Feelings Concerning Private Plots"; first paragraph is source introduction]

[Text] The articles "Profitable Place" and "Private Plots," published in IZVESTIYA issues for 9/10 and 10/11 August 1986, which discussed the role played by private plots in solving the Food Program and the problems being encountered by livestock owners, have aroused a considerable amount of reader response. The Editorial Board has received many letters from various republics and oblasts. Responses have been received from scientists, economists, soviet workers, agricultural specialists, kolkhoz members, sovkhoz workers and members of horticultural associations. The majority support the articles which appeared in the newspaper and they offer constructive recommendations for developing the family contract and private plots, associating such actions with the problem of self-support for the oblasts in the form of products. However, there are also letters in which the authors express their disagreement with the articles. In publishing today a portion of the responses, the Editorial Board allows the readers to judge where the truth lies. For our part, we reserve the right to return to a thorough analysis of this large amount of interesting mail.

Philosophy of Wage Leveling

The well known decree concerning unearned income has aroused a wave of "prohibitive measures," undertaken by soviet and legal organs. In some areas the maintenance of privately owned cattle is forbidden and in others a limitation has been placed upon income, hothouses have been torn down and the exporting of products has been discouraged. Typically, all of these measures are directed against the more active individuals who perform successfully both in production and on their private plots. At the same time, not one shirker who travels to the city for sausage or who fails to show any interest in the land has been condemned or ridiculed.

Actually, during the last decade, prior to the April (1985) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, our economic departments -- Gosplan, Minfin [Ministry of Finances], Goskomtsen [State Committee on Prices] and Goskomtrud [State Committee for Labor and Social Problems] -- created a type of wage-leveling philosophy which the local organs are presently ardently defending. Judge for yourself: hundreds of prohibitions and obstacles prevent an individual from making an honest wage.

Livestock keeper Monakhov and beekeeper Shcherbakov, who were discussed in the articles "Profitable Place" and "Private Plots," appear as a type of bomb for these departments. Indeed, by their work they reveal the artificial nature of the wage-leveling philosophy and they prove what an individual can do with land, not only in the absence of assistance but even in the face of clear opposition by local authorities.

Thanks is due to the party for the recently adopted law regarding private work activity. However, in the various areas only tongues are moving and not hands. And indeed the transfer over to families or workers of many operations being carried out in agriculture, domestic services and primitive trades, in the absence of capital investments, will make it possible to increase the production of deficit products and goods, improve their quality and release an army of administrative personnel for other tasks.

V. Suvorovtsev Novosibirsk

And What About Public Labor?

I am not in agreement with the handling of the question in the articles "Profitable Place" and "Private Plots," since it was resolved long ago in our country from both a theoretical and practical standpoint. In describing the private enterprise activities of Monakhov and Shcherbakov and in stating that they are needed by society, the author leads the reader to an incorrect understanding of our teaching regarding petty-bourgeois elements. And indeed it is even possible in this manner to justify the NEP [New Economic Policy], which was rejected by history and which has long since been forgotten.

Truly, some self-seekers have recently expanded their private plots and orchard plantings in some areas in the interest of private enterprise and excessive enrichment. Individuals have appeared who, with the permission of kolkhoz and sovkhoz leaders, are operating concessions for the production of farming and animal husbandry products on their assigned tracts and as a result they are earning many thousands of rubles of income. These include private silkworm breeders, onion producers, beekeepers, watermelon producers and other smart dealers. Thus, must we during this 70th year of Soviet rule accommodate these petty tradesmen and money grubbers and yield to them? Will such dodgers really help us solve the Food Program?"

We must not forget that private ownership aspirations cover the bodies of these money grubbers in the manner of eczema, such is the psychology of any bourgeois individual from birth. And if they are not limited by law, they will be free to engage in private enterprise and they will sell their products from markets throughout the entire country.

It is reasonable to ask why these people do not seek permanent work in these same professions at kolkhozes and sovkhoses. It is because once they are attached to a table of organization they are unable to earn more money than they can earn on the basis of contracts. The community of work is alien to them and their psychology is not to change until such time as we suppress them and draw them into public work.

G. Orekhov, Rubtsovsk

Removal of Obstacles

I grew up in the family of a blacksmith and thus I am familiar with all of the joys and sorrows of peasant life. It is no secret that voluntaristic decisions were undertaken during the 1960's. A campaign was launched aimed at combining the kolkhozes and reorganizing them into sovkhoses. And thus it was that peasant-kolkhoz members who were deeply concerned regarding their kolkhoz property and who tolerated a low wage in the hope of obtaining their own private plot, were converted into sovkhos workers and are now receiving wages. They were asked: why do you need cows and sheep? We will build you a city home and you can purchase your meat and milk in a store. The consequences of such thoughtless measures are being felt at the present time. The overwhelming majority of these state farms have now become unprofitable and despite the fact that a quarter of a century has passed, the government has been forced to raise the purchase prices for products and to introduce bonuses for adding on to these prices.

Scientific-technical progress and urbanization have intensified the spontaneous movement of the rural population into cities. Is it possible to justify both demographically and economically the need for one out of every five of the republic's residents living in the city of Tbilisi? A paradoxical situation has developed: the rural areas have an abundance of old people while the cities are faced with the problem of forcing parasites to work. And would it really not be worse for our economy if thousands of people from industrial enterprises and institutions were transferred to the rural areas to perform agricultural work?

In the articles "Profitable Place" and "Private Plots," statistical data was cited for a considerable number of subsidiary farms engaged in the production of agricultural products in Ryazan Oblast. They were also acceptable for other regions of the country and in Georgia their number was even higher. Moreover, this occurred in the face of obstacles which, despite a decision handed down by the party and government, were placed in the path of owners of livestock and private plots by local organs. Instead of thanking them for their work, we are still attaching to them the label of "private plot operator." Within the agroprom framework, we must remove all restrictions and all prohibitions against private work activity out on the land and especially in animal husbandry, the products of which are in short supply.

K. Ledyakov, Tbilisi economist

One With a Plowshare, Seven With Pitchforks

Earlier the markets in our Kuban villages were something to behold and everything was cheap. At the present time however, the villagers wait for milk and eggs to be delivered to the stores. This is why I vote in favor of livestock breeder Monakhov and beekeeper Shcherbakov and against those who like to count money in somebody else's pocket. It is said that there are many Monakhov's who obtain large amounts of unearned income at market. But much work is involved, it commences at 0300 or 0400 in the morning, there is the matter of farmyard manure, the care of young stock and the difficult experiences associated with the marketing of products.

No, the more workers we have of this type, the lower will be the prices. Meanwhile, we have dwelled upon the "Hungarian experiment" for many years and still no progress has been noted. The kolkhozes and sovkhoses, many of which have operated at a loss for decades, contain too many parasites. Remember how the pre-war ABC Book contained a drawing: one with a plowshare, seven with pitchforks. Are we not repeating this situation at the kolkhozes and sovkhoses? We have many teachers, accountants and leaders.

This is why we must defer to those who work indefatigably both on the kolkhoz fields and on their private plots.

Petrenko, machine operator,
Village of Udobnaya, Krasnodar Kray

Limiting Market Prices

Recently IZVESTIYA has published a number of articles on individuals who are selling agricultural products obtained on their private plots, without noting that many of them are converting these plots into their principal production operations and drawing unearned income from them. I was especially disturbed by the articles "Profitable Place" and "Private Plots." The time surely is at hand for dispossessing and confiscating everything acquired by individuals such as Monakhov, and yet you ask the kolkhozes to show concern for them. The people require limits on market prices and yet you say "it is impossible."

We are building a new society and struggling against the petty bourgeoisie while you support private endeavors and family contracts and indeed this is also private activity. A question arises: why is it that a high yield can be obtained from a family field, while at the same time it is difficult to obtain even seed from a kolkhoz field? Yes, they do not wish to work in the public sector. Yet everyone must be forced to work at maximum capability at the kolkhozes and sovkhoses. This requires that all avenues for unearned income be sealed off, such that all money earned comes from the principal production operations. Yes and why is it that more money is required under our system? The question concerning an exchange of monetary symbols arose long ago. Everything that has been acquired or built over and above that prescribed by law must be withdrawn. It is permissible to have private plots and yet they must not be 1 meter larger than the dimensions set forth in the regulations

and the work must be carefully monitored to ensure that the products produced are for consumption by the families involved and not for sale at the markets.

P. Zhurakhovskiy, Sevastopol

Horticulturists Also Cast A Favorable Vote

The articles "Profitable Place" and "Private Plots" were discussed during a meeting of horticulturists and they were adjudged to be of considerable importance. In the city of Nikopol alone, which has a population of 156,000, there are 22,000 gardeners who produce up to 20,000 tons of vegetables and fruit, meat and milk for their families and for the market.

The operational experience accumulated over a period of 10 years by the Nikopol Municipal Horticultural Society has shown that the intensive management of subsidiary farms requires the adoption of legislative acts concerned with the private plots of USSR citizens and regular voluntary societies of owners of farms under the direction of RAPO's [rayon agroindustrial associations] and by sections. In the process, the oblast councils of horticultural societies attached to oblsovprof's [oblast trade union councils] and other societies of an agricultural nature should be abolished, since their work amounts to merely collecting statistical data.

Such societies must promote a greater intensity of land utilization, the acquisition of implements, construction materials, light mechanization, livestock and poultry feed and veterinary services. A chief consideration is the need for ensuring that the "procurement offices" of raypotrebsoyuz's [rayon unions of consumers' societies] purchase the excess agricultural products at contractual prices in a timely and complete manner. A need also exists for legally validating the right of individuals to bring their surplus products to markets in their regions and beyond and to release them from the countless checks carried out by the militia. Control must be carried out not while enroute but rather at the market.

At the request of the society's aktiv: V. Ivashin,
V. Kapitan, V. Novikov and others. Nikopol

Ryazan Oblast Executive Committee Reports

The articles "Profitable Place" and "Private Plots" were examined during a meeting of the oblispolkom [oblast executive committee] and the criticism for the most part was adjudged to be correct. The ispolkom [executive committee] directed the attention of the agro-industrial committee (Chairman S. Polyanskiy), the rayon agro-industrial associations and the ispolkom's of rayon, villages and settlement soviets to the substantial shortcomings noted in the development of the private plots of citizens. It was recommended that the oblast agro-industrial committee study more thoroughly the experience accumulated in the use of a family contract for the fattening of cattle and the growing of vegetables and to utilize it more fully throughout the oblast. For the 12th Five-Year Plan, the measures which called for an increase in the numbers of livestock and poultry being maintained by the population have been approved and the tasks to be assigned to kolkhozes, sovkhoses and poultry

factories for the sale to rural residents of young cattle, swine and poultry stock, for supplying feed and also for increasing the production of swine based upon the use of food waste scraps have been defined.

The oblpotrebsoyuz [oblast union of consumers' societies] has been tasked with ensuring the sale of mixed feeds, construction materials, implements and other goods needed by the rural population. The purchasing of surplus agricultural products at all populated points has been organized on a contractual basis by the kolkhozes, sovkhoses and consumer cooperatives.

The problems concerned with developing the private plots of citizens were examined during an oblast conference for the chairmen of the executive committees of village and settlement soviets of people's deputies. In the interest of ensuring that each family maintains a cow, swine, sheep and poultry on its private plot, explanatory work among citizens residing in rural areas has been intensified.

The articles were discussed during a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Starozhilovskiy Rayon Soviet. For serious shortcomings in the development of the private economy, the chairman of the Chernobay Selispolkom [village executive committee] L. Pirogova and the chairman of the Zolotoy Kolos Kolkhoz A. Pakhomos were handed down strict punishments.

V. Zhirkhov
Chairman of the Executive Committee of the
Ryazan Oblast Soviet of Workers' Deputies

Referenced Earlier Articles

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Aug, 11 Aug 86

[Articles by A. Pushkar, IZVESTIYA correspondent: "Profitable Place"]

[10 Aug 86 p 3]

[Text]—Ryazan Oblast—Unfortunately, I learned about Monakhov, a trackman for the Priokskiy Communications Administration of Glavtransneft [Main Administration for Petroleum Transport and Deliveries], from a legal case.

Here is the essence of it: 37 year old Alkash Titov, a worker at a nearby kolkhoz, together with a young companion by the name of Surkov, sold Monakhov three bags of wheat that had been pilfered from a combine hopper for one and a half liters of home brew.

Almost the entire accusation was proven in the court. From a legal standpoint, it was a petty act. Monakhov, who was found harboring the home brew and the required apparatus, was sentenced to 3 years imprisonment with confiscation of property. And since execution of the sentence was deferred, Monakhov was turned over to the collective for retraining. But a search revealed a rather startling fact for the nonchernozem zone: in addition to a cow and a calf, militia workers counted 65 sheep and 100 geese on his private

plot. In this regard, the court handed down a partial decision regarding the ispolkom of the Chernobay Selsovet [village soviet], after directing attention to the lack of satisfactory control over the norms for the maintenance of livestock on private plots, according to which an individual was authorized to have not more than three ewes.

The fact that Monakhov was punished for having violated the law was quite clear. The economic aspect of the matter was not clear however. It can be said that sheep are gradually disappearing from the scene in Ryazan Oblast. Over the past 20 years, their numbers have declined by almost twofold and at the present time there are only 2 sheep for every agricultural worker in the oblast. And yet Monakhov had 65. And in the absence of tractors, machines, veterinary service and a bookkeeping department. How could an individual who is already 60 years of age handle such work and manage such a plot? What did he feed his animals if around his house there was only a plot of grass and a few trees?

Thus, together with the assistant procurator for Starozhilovskiy Rayon V. Lopatin and other local workers, we took leave of the Ryazan-Ryazhsk route and stopped in front of an old house that was concealed by oak and birch trees. No electric power lines could be seen entering the walls of the house. Earlier Monakhov employed a small engine, but it broke and now he uses a kerosene lamp and does not have a television set.

As a front line soldier, Monakhov could in all probability demand better housing and yet he has never exercised this right. Some time ago, the enterprise offered this trackman a one-room apartment in the small town of Mikhaylov, but Monakhov rejected the offer and asked to be allowed to remain in his written off home until 1987, in order to complete 25 years of work at the same place.

Although the house produced a dismal impression, the eyes were pleased by the yard which was brimming with life. There was a well from the top of which a chain unrolled and there were simple cattle sheds and a large hand-drawn cart for transporting hay, a scythe, pitchforks and an orchard and garden. A cow was methodically chewing its cud, a tethered calf was bellowing, dogs were barking, geese were honking, hens were cackling, sheep were bleating, bees were buzzing and turkeys were filling the yard with their cries. The animals were providing entertainment.

Aleksandr Stepanovich was a tall and lean individual wearing rubber boots and a faded cap. He appeared to be both intelligent and cunning.

During the war he participated in the sudden rush by the Soviet Army across the Great Khingansk Ridge, for which he was awarded the medal "For Combat Services." And later, communications specialist Monakhov aligned his fate with life along the gas pipeline route.

"Is it really possible to manage here without a plot? Have you departed your senses? For a family of five, my wages are barely enough to keep us in vegetable oil" stated Monakhov openly, who from childhood was accustomed to having calves, lambs, young pigs and a garden and the same holds true for

Mariya Grigoryevna. When they came from Moscow Oblast, where they lived initially, they brought with them not only three children but also an entire vehicle loaded with animals.

"Well, a landlord has arrived." gossiped the local residents, who had lost their interest in livestock: for the entire village of Chernobayevo consisting of 80 yards, there were 60 sheep and for a population of 5,000 in the village of Starozhilovo — 117 cows. For eggs and sour clotted milk, many traveled to Ryazan and for meat, sausage and butter — to Moscow.

Monakhov had his own products. It was for this reason that he arose at 0400 hours in the morning. Until 0800 hours he worked in the forest or in a ravine as concerned shepherds have always done. From 0800 hours in the morning until 0500 hours in the afternoon, he worked at his principal occupation and thereafter once again he remained out on the pastures until dark. He knew no rest during the haying period. The sides of roads, cuvettes, ravines, forested areas and forest glades were all worked by him. During both rainy and dry periods, there were always 2-3 stacks of plastic-covered hay in the vicinity of his house. He acquired an inguinal hernia from transporting mown hay in a hand cart. He also had many concerns during the winter. Indeed the livestock do not have any holidays or weekends off from work. Large quantities of water must be made available for the animals and feed must be prepared. Sheep, especially the lambs, love warm mash and fear drafts and he heats a special pen for them. And during the cold February days, when the lambing period commences, Monakhov takes the lambs home with him.

In return, the sheep respond to such concern: each ewe produces 2-3 lambs twice annually. And Monakhov's yard is not bothered by plague or murrain. Only once misfortune struck from the forest: on a dark autumn night, a wolf killed 17 sheep.

An important question: in view of his having a home farm, can this trackman be considered a valuable worker?

As stated by his command, the 25 kilometer line of Monakhov's sector, which he travels by bicycle or by passing vehicle, has operated in a continuous manner with no interruptions in communications. He has never been seen in a drunken state and the only complaint: when he appears in the department, even the smell of oil cannot overcome the odor of farmyard manure. The trade union meeting which discussed the incident took note of the fact that Monakhov participated in the Great Patriotic War, he is a communist labor shock worker, he has received many promotions and thereafter it provided the court with a good testimonial on him.

In the gossip which circulated regarding the Monakhov case, gossip which is still rampant in Starozhilovskiy Rayon, two points of view were expressed.

"An opportunist! A kulak! An intelligent individual who cleverly takes advantage of flaws in our economic system" hotly stated V. Lopatin, "And look how he lives. He is a slave to his livestock. He is sick! But it is a social rather than a medical illness — money-grubbing.

Some time ago, during a visit to Monakhov's farmstead, he made a comment, similar to that made by other rayon and oblast leaders, regarding the disparity between the livestock and the norms: on one occasion the rayon's procurator was sent to carry out an inspection. Appearing unexpectedly, he threatened to levy a fine if damage to the kolkhoz fields, caused by grazing cattle, was allowed to continue. But thereafter he departed owing to the fact that norms were cited in the law and no sanctions could be applied against those who were maintaining more livestock than needed. Lopatin thought this to be incorrect.

He was convinced that the three tons of grain forage uncovered during a search (albeit illegally, similar to a knife, blow-lamp or other objects) had been purchased by Monakhov not from markets, as the latter maintained, but rather from thieves. But the court, which had lowered Monakhov's degree of responsibility and which revealed that he had prepared the home brew for his son's wedding long before the edict, did not find proof of repeated marketing of the potion or grain embezzlement in large amounts.

Judge A. Kuchin, who had two children, was familiar with the case not only as a lawyer. He also maintained a young pig and earlier he had raised several young bulls, for which purpose the rayon command looked sideways. Thus he was familiar with the difficulties involved in procuring hay and tending livestock. "A kulak may also be a good worker. Just look at his hands." Paradoxically, somewhere in the depths of his soul the judge felt some pity for Monakhov.

And thus the violator of the law was scheduled for retraining. He did not grumble over the court's sentence, which called for the state to confiscate 35 sheep, and he did not abandon his livestock and poultry although during a bitter moment he longed to abandon his plot entirely. According to him, he presently retains seven ewes and their offspring. But the assistant procurator, after glancing about the farmstead, once again unnerved Monakhov regarding the entire herd. And this had to do with the campaign against unearned income.

"Why is it that the livestock are not added to the public herd?" demanded the predispolkom [chairman of the executive committee] of the Chernobay Village Soviet L. Pirogova.

Monakhov explained that he had taken them over a distance of one half kilometer to Mikhalkovo where there were 30 cows and 300 sheep and that now there was only one cow tethered in the manner of a dog. This village is deserted and it is too far to travel to Chernobay.

The law was dealing strictly with Monakhov and yet he did not harbor any complaint against the local authorities: he heard over the radio that people are being urged to acquire livestock and yet forage is not for sale and no haying land is being allocated. He approached the chairman of the rayispolkom and was told: "You have a gas pipeline -- thus you can mow the right of way." But the grass there is being damaged by kolkhoz livestock.

"You plowed under the porch of my house and all of the forest borders have been poisoned by chemicals -- where can I mow?" asked Monakhov, turning to the chairman of the Zolotoy Kolos Kolkhoz A. Pakhomov.

"I have nothing of my own. Just as in your case, I do nothing for myself but only for the state" replied the latter.

"And I sell meat to the state and the cooperatives. Over a period of 20 years, I have turned over 15 tons of veal and mutton and one and a half quintals of wool. Here are the receipts," stated Monakhov, with the covering documents in his hands.

"And how much did you ship to market? What did you sell the geese for? Why were the people fleeced? the assistant procurator ceased his venomous questioning at this point.

"I did not sell in America" stated Monakhov, refusing to yield. It should be stated that traveling to market provided him with no special advantage, since animals are purchased both from the public farms and from private tradesmen at the rate of 2 rubles per kilogram of weight and the purchase price in a conversion for meat is almost equal to the market price.

"I ask for someone to come and accept the milk. Nobody comes, the milk spoils and thus I am forced to feed it to the dogs," exclaimed the grieving Monakhov, "I go to the livestock procurement office and offer my rams. Nobody takes them because the Ryazan Meat Combine is processing only young bulls. I go to a store -- they will not take more than one ram: they lack a refrigerator. And I cannot wait an entire season."

In addition to myself, this frank admission was overheard by L. Pirogova who, as it turned out, had never before, during one and a half year's service as chairman of the ispolkom, had never before visited such a serious producer of livestock products as Monakhov. During 20 years of his life along the right of way, Monakhov had never encountered members of the kolkhoz administration, deputies of the selsovet or cooperative specialists. Why? It would have been useful for concluding contracts, for the sale of forage or for the sale of veal, mutton or goose meat which he would deliver in the autumn. And thus Monakhov himself obtained the feed and he procured a vehicle himself and went to Ryazan to the market. What was the sale price and how much was sold?

"We blame Monakhov for having fleeced people. And how was your kolkhoz represented at market?" I asked Pakhomov.

There were periods of drought and rainfall, the plans kept increasing and we attempted to catch up. Today, with stable plans and authorization, a portion of the products grown on the fields and farms can perhaps be sold at the market. For example, who will transport the products and who will count the money? The chairman or the bookkeeper? Yes and there are those who will not trust them with this work.

I listened to the chairman and thought to myself. Well, something has turned up! They do not have confidence in their own kolkhoz members. Recently,

mention was made in the press of a lack of control. If you please, the economy suffers to an equal degree from a lack of trust.

The kolkhoz did not trade at the market -- the chairman haughtily disdained even the thought of selling some of his own surplus products there.

"My mother's large garden was strewn with apples" stated Anatoliy Zakharovich, "I could have earned three weeks pay if I had sold them and yet I was obligated not to engage in personal enrichment. And my brother, secretary of the party committee, also could not sell them. Thus the apples were simply wasted."

Here, at the table at which we were seated, under large noisy birch trees, a dispute arose. It was shameful to sell them, but it was not shameful to allow the apples to rot on the ground.

Certainly, stinginess is repugnant to us. But is boasting and extravagance better and would this be morally correct? Each year, 20 percent or one fifth of everything grown on fields and farms is lost as a result of mismanagement. This fact was revealed during the June (1986) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. Is it not possible for us to learn something about money-grubbing in the public sector? This is not the first time that we have encountered such philosophers. They are also to be found among my respected friends, all of whom have orchard and garden plots. "What if I, a former colonel of militia, stood behind a market counter? What would you say?" It turns out that our unwritten law does not permit us to do this, to trade on the market in the manner of Monakhov. No, we are not against the market, but we wish to be overfastidious and reserve for ourselves the right to demand price control from the state and to obligate tradesmen as we see fit. And is this our worker-peasant psychology? More accurately, it is a grand and haughty psychology.

And indeed the kolkhoz market is not an alien endeavor. Trade carried out on this market is considered to be very necessary for the nation and worthy of any rank. Thus, wear your decoration retired comrade colonel; undertake a risk for yourself comrade kolkhoz chairman and take up a position behind the market counter. All through life you have campaigned against second-hand dealers, speculators and administrative methods. The time is now at hand for trying economic methods. Kolkhozes, cooperative and horticultural societies can and must, on the basis of common efforts, become market barons.

But let us now return to the sheep, which no longer belong to Monakhov but rather to the kolkhoz. Confiscated by the court, they were acquired by the Zolotoy Kolos Kolkhoz for "breeding purposes." Pakhomov did not wish to show them, maintaining that this was a small matter for the kolkhoz. However, I insisted and did in fact see them: at the height of a hot summer they were located in a neglected cow barn chewing on old hay. Some of them had not even been sheared, despite the fact that the shearing period had long since passed: there was not even a wool plan. Nor was it a matter of grams of wool. During the summer, wearing their burr-covered fur coats, the sheep headed straight to the animal burial grounds. At the present time, of the 35 sheep, only 26 remain. Some died and others were slaughtered and there were only three

offspring. By law, the sheep should have provided income for the state and society. But what happened?

In discussing this matter, I do not wish to cast a shadow on Pakhomov -- in the final analysis, it is a matter for the administration, even if tomorrow the remaining sheep were to be cut up for shashlik. But how does one evaluate the moral-economic aspect: when with Monakhov, the sheep wintered in a normal manner and propagated and when the herd was with Pakhomov it decreased in size. Moreover, the herd is decreasing in size from year to year at the neighboring Shevtsovskiy Sovkhoz, which specializes in sheep breeding. At this sovkhov there are 220 workers for 1,400 sheep, that is, seven sheep per worker and they are obtaining 65 lambs from 100 ewes. Meanwhile, the sovkhov is fulfilling its plan. It is as though a contract has been concluded here for collective irresponsibility, with participation by rank and file and also leading workers, from a cow tender to chairman of the rayispolkom [rayon executive committee], who obtains his income from imagined prosperity.

This phenomenon is explained by the fact that there is only sufficient hay for calves, there are no facilities, expenditures are not being reimbursed and sheep are generally unprofitable.

On the return trip, the assistant procurator scrupulously calculated Monakhov's income, who in his opinion had maintained as many as 100 sheep and 200 geese during some years. During a year's time, he sold 50 sheep for 70 rubles and 100 geese for 20 rubles -- this is five and a half thousand plus a bull and at times two bulls.

Why does an old man need such money? There were times when he gave the children ample amounts of money and supplied all with apartments and vehicles. They began to check: nothing of the sort, as an older person who wished to acquire a cooperative apartment, his father rejected money. No great amount of money was listed in Monakhov's savings bank book. Although rumors were that his money-box contained a million rubles, it was never found by the militia. Did he have a particular goal? In court he stated that he would soon retire and that he wished to purchase a home in a suburb of Ryazan closer to his children.

"Monakhov is not typical of our society; his type is out of fashion" the sentence handed down by Lopatin was final and severe, "The children had their reasons for not remaining with him."

And yet he was a concerned father. During the winter, he accompanied his children to school despite blizzard-like conditions. Perhaps he maintained many livestock so as to be able to support their studies in Ryazan.

In the evening, I go to the outskirts of the oblast center where, not far from petro-chemical enterprises, Monakhov's children were living in a workers' microregion. I found the daughter of the "millionaire" relaxing at the edge of a pond.

Monakhov's senior son, a builder with one child and a pregnant wife, lives in a boarding house of the hotel type. His younger son, a technologist, lives

with his wife and child in a conventional boarding house. Tatyana, a radio plant controller, and her husband Vasiliy, who is a highly skilled operator of a truck-mounted crane, live in a small hotel room.

In a corner that is partitioned off, there is a hide-a-bed, a table and an electric plate. This is everything. Certainly, according to Tatyana, these spartan conditions were alright at 20 but not at 30 years of age. But they were still happy with this arrangement after 7 years of life in this partial apartment, for which they pay 50 rubles a month.

They discussed their father. They tried to persuade him: abandon the livestock and come to the city. But he did not do so. Tatyana and Vasiliy sometimes help out by cutting down the hay and pushing a hand cart filled with the mown grass. From their parent's home, they bring back eggs, milk and sometimes meat.

"We stop in at a store in order to purchase sprats in tomato sauce" muttered Vasiliy, "There is a line of customers waiting to buy chops and a fight breaks out over the sausages for sale. Yes and what would the situation be like if only old people remained in the villages?"

"Why is it that you young people, with such intelligent thoughts and golden hands, torture yourselves here on the outskirts of the city where the smell of chemicals is so strong?" I thought to myself, "Why not transfer to the village where you will be given a cottage, your father will give you a gift of a calf and a ewe lamb and thereafter you can live to your heart's content? And Vasiliy had already examined the farmstead homes, was envious of them and was not against moving to the village, were it not for Tatyana."

What is the problem? It is hellish work. The problem of farmyard manure is a continuing one. Here I work a shift and then can relax on the shore of a pond. But there one does not even have a chance to sit down. The father sometimes says "I taught you in vain to work in the countryside." No! Not for any money!

Thus, does society need such zealous private plot operators as Monakhov or should sanctions be applied against them? Should the father's plot be inherited? I have weighed all of the "pros" and "cons."

But more about this in the next letter.

[11 Aug 86 p 3]

[Text] I traveled over the green hills and rayons of Ryazan Oblast and in watching the cattle grazing in the various areas, I recalled my childhood. In our region there were five villages and each had its own herd consisting of dozens of cows and heifers and hundreds of sheep and goats. This entire armada, bleating and bellowing, passed our house three times daily as it traveled back and forth to the pasture. Such was the tenor of life. The shepherd, shouldering his gun-like staff, was an imposing figure.

The broad high roads, grazing areas and common pastures, which had existed since ancient times, had all disappeared. The outskirts of the village were all plowed. From two to three cows and several calves that were attached to stakes in the ground grazed on lawn plots surrounding houses and alongside streams. Sheep and goats which were always present earlier were nowhere to be seen.

Ryazan Oblast is characterized by a high degree of plowed land, with a type of taboo being imposed upon the number of hectares of arable land. Only I fail to understand why everything is plowed here when the grain productivity during the last five-year plan was 11 quintals per hectare. And why is it that the taboo does not apply to the land surrounding the oblast center, Ryazansk, which recently celebrated the birth of its 5,000th resident, its plants, vacant lots, dumps and microregions, which for some reason are not growing deeper, higher or in breadth?

But perhaps there is no reason to become alarmed: there is an agroprom with tense plans. I glance at the statistical figures. Yes, similar to other oblasts in the nonchernozem zone, there have been large investments and much has been accomplished. For example, thanks to the construction of a poultry factory, with state support in the form of feed, the problem of supplying the population with poultry meat and eggs has been solved.

However, taking into account all categories of farms, it can be said that over a period of 20 years 300,000 sheep perished throughout the oblast and 100,000 swine. After reaching a high point in 1975, productivity thereafter declined. Accordingly, less meat appeared on the tables of residents of the oblast. But the refrigerators of the Ryazansk residents were not empty. They went to Moscow aboard electric trains and thereafter the trains returned carrying strong smelling sausages and the passengers were burdened with rucksacks and bags. According to estimates by economists, the residents of Ryazansk brought back approximately 9,000 tons of meat products to add to the fund of 33,000 tons which they already held.

Statistics are impartial: today the private plots are furnishing one third of the meat being produced in the oblast, one fourth of the milk, up to one half of the potatoes and large amounts of cucumbers, onions and other products. Thus they must not be rejected in the same way Monakhov's farmstead in Starozhilovskiy Rayon was rejected. And does this apply only there? The number of livestock on peasant private plots continues to decline: from 1965 to 1985 the number of cows decreased by a factor of 2.5, sheep -- by 3.5 and swine -- by almost fourfold.

The chairman of the Ryazansk Oblast Agro-Industrial Committee, S. Polyanskiy, explains this migration of villagers to cities in terms of a reduction in the number of workers generally and the aging of workers at kolkhozes and sovkhoses. Moreover, the people seemed to have lost the desire to work with animals.

"You are city-dwellers and thus parasites" stated Semen Yakovlevich, half jokingly and half serious, "It means little to you that machine operators and livestock breeders work 12-16 hours daily. But how many of you would work on

a farm or out on a field if you had a great amount of work to carry out at home? Indeed it is impossible to work at maximum capability in both places. The work will be carried out in a slipshod manner either at home or at the sovkhos."

Or take another aspect. An individual is a tractor operator and receives 300 rubles and his wife is a milkmaid and also earns 300 rubles. Are they not entitled to normal recreation, to sit in front of a television set and to travel south? But if they have a cow, sheep, young pigs or geese, they can never travel. It is especially difficult for workers in the principal professions to maintain livestock and thus they are forced to unite in groups of 3-4 families and to create a cooperative within a cooperative. No, earnings in public production must be the principal source in the life of an individual.

Such was the reasoning of the chairman of the oblagroprom [oblast agro-industrial committee], the plan of which, commencing with the new year, calls for a considerable amount of products to be produced in the private economy.

His words contained a considerable amount of labor truth. The true backwardness of social conditions in the rural areas compared to municipal conditions and the systematic disruption here of the regimes for labor and relaxation, like a fetish of a municipal pastime, are devastating the rural areas just as in the past. At the same time, S. Polyanskiy obviously acquainted me with pseudo-objective factors which could account for everything. Moreover, there are bellwether farms in the country such as the Tula Kolkhoz imeni Lenin, where a peasant long ago ceased being a peasant -- a high level of labor productivity makes it possible to satisfy all of his needs by means of the public economy. But indeed, not all of the kolkhozes and sovkhoszes will be following this path right away. Thus thought must be given to the peasant private plots.

Meanwhile, almost a decade has passed since the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers adopted the decree on the development of private plots, but only one out of four families in the oblast has a cow or there is only one young pig for every three peasant yards. Certainly, the rural areas have "aged" considerably and yet, despite the statement by the chairman of the oblagroprom, the desire to raise livestock and poultry has become stronger.

But a question arises here: where will the young stock come from? There are not enough calves and young pigs for those desiring them. The plans for selling them are not being carried out owing to the fact that the market price for a young pig has jumped from 20 to 75 rubles in recent years. And the lines of those waiting to procure young chicks are long! Moreover, one half of the one-day old chicks being sold are perishing. According to Semen Yakovlevich, the raising of chicks has not been organized owing to the fact that the central organs (Glavptitseprom) are not allocating feed to Ryazan for this purpose. Very few ducklings are being sold. And there is no need for even mentioning young geese or turkeys. They simply have not been nor are they presently available for sale.

Indeed, there is a mind-set for the childish game of centralism, which appears to lower the responsibility of those who live off the land. Is it really necessary at the present time, after agroprom has been extended considerably rights, for USSR Gosplan to concern itself with the problems of chicks and young pigs in Ryazan and the organization of deliveries of young geese? No, this is your work Comrade Polyanskiy. Remember the grannies who are still living in neglected villages and conclude contracts with them. Provide them with 50 rather than 100 young geese and several bags of forage. And then the market monopolist Monakhov, in the absence of any agreement with Goskomsen [State Price Committee], will lower the price for his own geese.

A second question: where will the livestock be maintained? In the opinion of Candidate of Science and chief veterinary doctor at the Sovkhoz imeni Lenin K. Nikolayev, a malicious joke was played by the construction of multiple apartment dwellings at kolkhozes and sovkhozes -- what sheep and cows are here? Look at the sheds -- for one young pig and a dozen hens! There are very good plans, but Agropromstroy and Ryazanstroy are persistently lagging behind with the blessings of the Ryazan Oblast office of Gosbank [State Bank] and the oblispolkom in the interest of economy. Can it be that they still do not understand that a peasant without livestock and a farmstead is like a tree without roots?

Yes and the chief restraining factor is the shortage of grazing land and feed. In the central section, there is no place for the livestock to graze. The residents of the village of Khrushchevo and the central farmstead of the Sovkhoz imeni Lenin must take turns grazing their livestock. The sovkhoz supplies feed to only a partial degree. There are so many desiring to conclude contracts with cooperation for meat deliveries and for forage that the raypo [rayon consumers' society] simply does not know how to reject their requests politely. This is why there are 200 cows, 600 sheep and 3 goats for the 600 families at the sovkhoz.

Bread is being purchased for young pigs out of need: feed is not available for sale anywhere.

Is there any type of accounting for bread expenditures? There is. Statistics reveal that bread consumption throughout the oblast is roughly 40 percent higher than that called for in the rational norms for nourishment. One oblast worker secretly informed me that of 120,000 tons of bread sold in the rural areas, approximately 30,000 tons, according to his computation, were used for fed purposes. It turns out that many owners of livestock, in conformity with the law, should be fined or taken to court.

I believe that social fairness requires that citizens bear legal responsibility both for discharging bread into refuse chutes and for displaying a formal attitude towards the gathering up of food waste scraps, concern for which must be evidenced by municipal enterprises. A chief consideration is the fact that the fewer the waste scraps the greater the responsibility of baking industry workers for the quality and freshness of the bread, which in Ryazan are beneath criticism. Is it worth developing a variety that is not very edible? Would it not be better, after raising the

quality, to curtail the baking of bread and thus be able to make more mixed feed for sale to the population?

Are there still sources of feed available? How many are still waiting patiently to obtain garden plots of neglected villages that are overgrown with burdocks and stinking nettles? Many specialists with whom I had contact believe, as mentioned during the 27th Party Congress, that the agroprom must convert over more boldly to contractual — private and cooperative — forms for labor organization in vegetable production and horticulture and to purchasing surplus products at the entrances to horticultural associations and, having tasked them with growing dill and parsley, to release resources for large-scale mechanized animal husbandry and the production of grain and feed. Indeed, it must be assumed that agroprom, which is tasked with developing both the public and private sectors, will not only insert unnecessary zeros in its summaries, but in addition it will display concern, through the kolkhozes and sovkhozes, for the gardens, orchards and livestock of private plot operators and serve as a full-fledged intermediary between them and the state.

But why private plot operators? It would seem appropriate to state, as set forth in recent decisions handed down by the party and government, that the development of private plots should be viewed as being a logical extension of a public farm and as a form for organizing the production of products by a kolkhoz or sovkhoz. But no haste is being displayed in introducing this form into operations.

I noted long ago that workers attached to local organizations entertained two opinions regarding private plots. On the one hand, the decree by the party and government must be encouraged and carried out and, on the other, it must be restrained in order to prevent the private gardens from causing harm to the public economy and in the interest of preventing corruption and excessive enrichment.

It is recalled how in the Primorye region, where amateur beekeepers have apiaries consisting of 50 bee colonies and P. Shcherbakov even had 100, the leaders of the krayispolkom [kray executive committee] intended to limit their potential to 25 hives, suspecting them of exploiting foreign labor and other violations of our legal system and morals. But a check carried out on Shcherbakov, failed to reveal anyone else working at his apiary other than his sons, daughters-in-law and grandchildren. At this point, a new argument was advanced: "Did you know that during the course of a season, he earns 32,000 rubles, or more than an academician?" Why is it that we are not stingy when it comes to paying for rank and title, yet we fear overpaying for a private labor contribution, one which furnishes many deficit products? One beekeeper sells up to 10 tons of honey on a cooperative basis each year.

No, let the state linden tree cry its nectar tears, letting them fall to the ground! -- the Primorskiy krayispolkom refuses to yield as it prepares a letter containing recommendations for placing limitations on beekeepers. And they would have been introduced into operations, were it not for the fact that they were sensibly rejected by the RSFSR Council of Ministers.

At the present time, with society having declared a relentless campaign against unearned income, drunkenness and parasites, we must investigate this difficult problem: are "benchmarks" required for private management, that is, people who wish to work a great deal and to maintain more livestock than authorized in the norms established in 1964. I have overheard some conflicting opinions.

Certainly, we are not pleased by the "livestock slave" Monakhov and high burdensome labor and money-grubbing. But his farmstead once again reminds us that a peasant yard can not only provide food for internal consumption but in addition it can produce many other products — for the market, for consumer cooperation or for a kolkhoz or sovkhoz plan. And this is for one worker using a hand cart, scythe, pitchforks and a spade. And how many geese and sheep can be maintained by a dynamic peasant family consisting of seven members, if it is able to purchase a horse or a motorized unit or if a contractual agreement is concluded with it? Five hundred sheep and 1,000 geese? Why limit this potential or the participation of grandfathers and grandmothers, children and grandchildren to one or two cows, 10 or 20 sheep or one or two sows. If a family has feed, there is no great difference, but for the state there is a twofold profit. Should the unused strengths of work veterans be restrained: yes, let them have livestock, poultry and bees, as many as their health will permit.

Thus it turns out that Monakhov and Shcherbakov are needed. They are not thieves but honorable individuals. And in order for them to become such, business-like and punctual partner relationships had to be established with them. We give you young stock and feed and you give us meat. You need a machine for transporting hay or products — you must be punctual at all times.

But how can income be regulated? There was a time when a heavy agricultural task suppressed any desire on the part of a peasant to maintain animals. At the present time, the tax is negligible and some workers whom I met believe that the norms are not needed but that the tax is necessary. But what kind of tax? An agroprom official said to me that the tax should be such that of the 32,000 rubles earned, 25,000 should go to the state and the remaining 7,000 should be retained by the individual: the linden tree is nevertheless the property of the state.

Is not the well known motif of the dog and the hay evident in this handling of the problem? Rather than genuine concern for state interests, is this not more a case of over-cautiousness, becoming accustomed to wage-levelling or perhaps even envy of the unusual expertise and earnings? He favors the successful and harmonious development of both the public and private economies. And if there must be an income tax for livestock breeding, horticulture and gardening, then let it be one which will not suppress but rather stimulate a rapid saturation of the market with deficit products.

It bears mentioning that data obtained from sociological studies dictates that a cow is not a hothouse filled with radishes, a young pig is not a rose and a sheep is not a tulip. In short, it is difficult to become rich from livestock and if somebody becomes rich, then it is difficult to refer to this income as unearned. Moreover, these problems should be discussed publicly and

thoroughly in order to ensure that the campaign against unearned income is not handled in a poor manner as has been the case in other oblasts. In the 1950's, demagogues promised abundant riches and forced rural residents to do away with their livestock.

Recently, much has been said in the press and from tribunes regarding family contracts and the Hungarian experiment. However, what actually happened? Monakhov grazed his livestock and the rayon authorities, from the very beginning, displayed irritation and hostility in accepting the existence of his large herd. They traveled the road in front of his farmstead never suspecting that they were passing a model for the family contract and a waste-free economy, where sheep, since ancient times in the nonchernozem zone, have coexisted with cows, gathering up the residue of the hay consumed by them, geese with turkeys, bees with cucumbers and milk with the farmyard manure for gardens. Not once did anybody stop by to display interest in what was taking place. Nor was any thought given to having the Ministry of the Petroleum Industry "absorb" this livestock breeder for agroprom. There are no prophets in our native land nor have there ever been any in the past!

And yet they do indeed exist. Since ancient times, the residents of Starozhilovskiy and Pronskiy rayons have been attracted to sheep. Spas'kiy Rayon is celebrated for its cucumbers, Korostovoy is known for its cabbage and Bogoroditskiy Rayon in Tula Oblast is praised for its sows. Thus, should these areas be reproached for the prices asked for these products? Would it not be better to devote some thought as to why they calve their cows so carefully, the geese hatch their yellow goslings, the ewes and sows provide two litters annually and why the private plots furnish 300 quintals of potatoes per hectare while the kolkhozes and sovkhoses are unable to obtain 100 quintals?

Yes, they were handed down from ancestors. Cucumber, cabbage and onion villages in Ryazan Oblast and sheep, swine and geese villages in the Russian nonchernozem zone — these are clusters of national experience, islands which have remained since peasantry days. A cherished word — produced on the basis of startling industry and diligence, memory of the experience of ancestors and enterprise — the chief components of the concept of culture of labor.

Our economic and filial obligation — to gather up, describe and retain many centuries of experience. The local organs must encourage the inheriting of exemplary gardens and orchards, mini-farms and apiaries. Some rayons should possibly declare certain zones to be traditional areas for animal husbandry, gardening and horticulture. And it is specifically these rayons which should be provided with the long-awaited light mechanization equipment.

There are several animal-lover societies. Exhibits of dogs decorated with medals are regularly seen on television, but former VDNKh [Exhibition of Achievements of the National Economy of the USSR] have not been seen for quite some time — hostesses for pedigree swine from Bogoroditskiy Rayon. The dog breeders must forgive me, but I believe that a Romanov sheep is more notable than the most notable dog and perhaps a society for sheep breeders should be

created. Indeed, even the special decisions handed down by republic organs concerning the development of Romanov sheep breeding are not being carried out.

There is still one other aspect of our problem. It would seem that the greater the concentration the greater the profit: for example, two individuals and a tractor were assigned to a herd of sheep -- and a great amount of enthusiasm. But sheep are pasture animals and, similar to hens and young pigs, they cannot be maintained in congested facilities. They cannot endure concrete walls, dampness, drafts or strong odors. Sheep dream of a small farm, horses with sledges and a family contract.

Once again, the fields and copses of Ryazan Oblast. Upon departing, I think to myself: will there come a time when Vasiliy and Tatyana, the daughter of a "millionaire-trackman" will return to the village? We will restore our silk fields and grazing and pasture lands, we will return to graze the sheep and a new type of genius will be born in the Ryazan village, one who will fascinate us with poetry. Or, crowded into cities, we will place our teeth on a shelf and thereafter acquire a sun-tan alongside a pond, as we wait for science and engineering, in their omnipotence, to create for us a type of manna from the heavens.

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ERRATUM: This article is reprinted
from JPRS-UNE-87-007 of 29 January 1987
pp 16-27, to provide omitted passages.

AGRO-ECONOMICS, POLICY, ORGANIZATION

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TASKS FOR IMPROVING APK ECONOMIC MECHANISM VIEWED

Moscow EKONOMIKA SELSKOGO KHOZYAYSTVA in Russian No 10, Oct 86 pp 27-35

[Article by G. Atrakhimovich, deputy chief, Main Administration for the Planning and the Social and Economic Development of the APK, USSR Gosagroprom; and A. Kirin, deputy chief, Administration for Improving the Economic Mechanism and Price Formation, USSR Gosagroprom: "Economic Stimulation of the Production and Procurement of Agricultural Products"]

[Text] The most important direction for further improving the economic mechanism in the country's agro-industrial complex is to perfect the economic stimulation of agricultural production and state procurements of output. This, together with financial measures such as the budget financing of targeted plan measures and programs in agriculture and other sectors of the APK, long and short term state credits, the insurance of property and crops, the creation of physical and financial reserves in each enterprise and centralized at APK management organs, and payments to the state budget should assure the effectiveness of cost accounting, and the conversion of kolkhozes, sovkhozes, associations and other agricultural enterprises to a self-supporting basis.

For the 12th Five-Year Plan, the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers Decree "On Further Improvements in the Economic Mechanism of the Country's Agro-Industrial Complex" for the most part retains the system of stimulating state purchases of agricultural products existing after the May (1982) CPSU Central Committee Plenum. It has been further developed in accordance with 27th Party Congress decisions which posed the task of opening space for economic methods, considerable expansions in kolkhoz and sovkhoz independence and enhancements in their interest and responsibility for final results.

The decree's specific economic measures to improve the economic mechanism specify new tasks for APK management organs, agricultural and other enterprises and organizations. These involve stimulating procurement and price formation and ways of solving problems at various production and management organization levels. Expanding the rights of kolkhozes and sovkhozes to use their own products and to select channels for their sales increases the demands made upon the economic feasibility of decisions and permits them to display initiative and entrepreneurial skills to improve production efficiency.

Grain procurement plans for the 12th Five-Year Plan have been stabilized at the 1986 level. The return sales of motor vehicles, tractors, various types of agricultural machinery and other supplies in high demand have been organized for farms overfulfilling their grain sales plans. USSR Gosagroprom has been entrusted with setting up special material reserves for these purposes. If grain purchase plans are not met, and if this is not due to natural calamities, there are corresponding reductions in the delivery of feed grains or mixed feeds from state reserves.

As a rule, grain crop seed shipments to republics, krais and oblasts above the planned amount will be made in exchange for or as a loan with obligatory repayment from next year's harvest.

In order to stimulate increases in state grain procurements during 1986-1990, kolkhozes, sovkhoses and other agricultural enterprises will be given pay markups up to 100 percent if plans for state purchases of grain are fulfilled (50 percent for farms exceeding this level, but not fulfilling their plans) for grain produced above the 11th Five-Year Plan average level. These markups for durum wheat, buckwheat, peas, millet, beans, mung beans, garbanzos and lentils are paid independently of overfulfillment of sales levels for all grain.

A differentiated approach to stimulating the procurement of the most valuable food grain, pulse and groat crops helps kolkhozes and sovkhoses expand plantings of these crops, concentrates efforts to: improve their yields, based upon the extensive use of intensive technology, attach crops to contract collectives, use family and personal contracts and substantially strengthen farm economies. The existing practice of paying state grain markups to farms which have not been assigned sales plans gives many farms interest in growing the above crops, even though, for various reasons, they had previously not been in the crop rotations. Additional material incentives have been developed for contract collectives growing these valuable food crops. They can be physical payments, as for other plant and animal products, of up to 25 percent of the grain harvest obtained above a contractually determined volume. At the same time conditions are created for improving the population's supply of products from processed food grains.

Payment of markups of up to 50 percent of purchase price for kolkhoz and sovkhos and other agricultural enterprise sales of the following products to the state in excess of levels attained in the 11th Five-Year Plan have been extended through 1987-1990: sunflowers, sugar beets, raw cotton (fiber), soybeans, flax and hemp products (straw, stock, fiber), potatoes, tea leaves, hops, mustard, essential oil crops, poppies (including seed), livestock, poultry, milk, wool, karakul and non-ossified deer antlers [source of pharmacological preparations]. Table grapes, citrus fruits, common onions, garlic and alfalfa, clover and cereal grass seeds are also included on the list for payment of this markup.

The decree notes that citizens' private subsidiary operations are a component of socialist agricultural production and that there is a need, based upon kolkhoz and sovkhos help, to more completely satisfy rural inhabitants' demand

for meat, milk, eggs, potatoes, fruit, vegetables and other food products, selling the surpluses through cooperative trade and kolkhoz markets. It acknowledges the need for kolkhoz, sovkhos and other agricultural enterprises' plans to be developed with regard both to public production operations and the private subsidiary operations of citizens living on their territories

In examining these points and their inseparable linkage, one notes that the degree specifies the conversion to the territorial principle of planning production and accounting for agricultural product sales.

The population retains the right to independently sell the products it produces either on the kolkhoz market or to state procurement organizations without intermediation by farms or consumer cooperatives. There can be no compulsion here. In accordance with the decree kolkhozes, sovkhos and other enterprises in the APK are required only to increase the sales of grain feeds, coarse and succulent feeds, seed and planting stock, young animals and poultry and solid fuel to the public and expand assistance to private plot owners in tilling their plots, give them agrochemical and veterinary assistance and completely satisfy the public's demand for young pigs and poultry in the next two years. In turn, kolkhozes and sovkhos retain the right to conclude contracts with people living outside their territories to raise livestock and poultry and to purchase surplus milk from them. These products will count towards the farms' fulfillment of plans for sales to the state.

The territorial principle for accounting for purchases essentially puts an obstacle before individual farmer managers purchasing livestock and other agricultural products beyond the limits of the enterprise, since they do not exert any efforts for their production.

A fundamental feature in the payment of markups for output growth is the calculation of its average level during the 11th Five-Year Plan. It is important here that purchase volumes through sales channels be comparable and that there is no reduction in farm earnings or any unearned additional income from the budget as a result of the incorrect determination of the average sales levels. The compilation of accounts on the average levels of agricultural product sales to the state during the 11th Five-Year Plan will not differ from similar work done prior to the beginning of this five-year plan, (more accurately in quarters I and II, 1981). The accounts should include products sold by farms during 1981-1985 through the following channels: to enterprises and organizations acting as procurers, counted towards farm fulfillment of sales to the state (this does not include product purchases from the public by kolkhozes and sovkhos on the basis of contracts for raising young animals and poultry and the purchase of surplus milk from private operations); sold to cooperative organizations or on kolkhoz markets. For the purpose of markup payments during 1986-1990, the calculation of average sales during the 11th Five-Year Plan should also include products not counted towards fulfillment of plans for sales to the state. These are: livestock and poultry that consumer cooperatives purchase from people living on farms.

The need for this division and grouping of products sold is due to different information sources on sales through various channels during 1981-1985.

The volume of state agricultural products purchases during the 11th Five-Year Plan is determined through the following documents: receipts, reception delivery deeds or summary documents, compiled in the established manner at farms or rayon statistical administrations according to results from product sales during this plan, including the annual compilation of statements by product type.

Farms have data on output sales not counted towards plan fulfillment during the 11th Five-Year Plan. These include products sold at kolkhoz markets. Procurement offices at rayon consumer cooperatives can provide data on products cooperatives purchase from people living on farms. Accounts must be kept of the average sales levels for each product and for each sales channel so that the average level of product sales during the 11th Five-Year Plan can be determined for each channel. Without such summary accounts data on sales volumes during the 11th and 12th Five-Year Plans will be incomparable.

For most farms permanently engaged in commercial animal and crop production, the average level of agricultural product sales during the 11th Five-Year Plan is defined as the total volume sold through all the channels over a 5 year period, divided by 5. This calculation method for all sales channels should remain unchanged throughout the 12th Five-Year Plan.

Deviations from the general rule for calculating average levels are permissible only for: farms which during the 11th Five-Year Plan had the possibility of selling products to the state, did not participate in supplementing state food and agricultural raw material reserves; farms which are for the first time producing, in a planned manner, various animal and crop products; sovkhoses and other state animal complexes (for 10,000 and more head of beef cattle, 54,000 and more hogs,) and poultry factories supplied with mixed feeds from state resources. Instructions explain the specifics for calculating average sales levels at these farms and accounting bases for determining their total markups. We only note the main principle here: the payment, during the first three years of planned sales and during the mastery of planned capacity at large animal complexes and poultry factories, of markups over purchase prices for products sold over planned levels.

Total markups to be paid during 1986-1990 are calculated on the basis of average payments per ton of product sold during the current year at purchase prices (including markups and rebates for quality) to enterprises and organizations entrusted with state procurement functions. In order to simplify accounts, total markups for grain (except types for which markups are paid even if overall sales plans are not fulfilled) are determined on the basis of average payments for all other types of grain.

Different lists of products for which these markups will be paid have been drawn up for 1986 and 1987-1990. The 1986 supplement to the list of products for which 50 percent markups were paid during the 11th Five-Year Plan includes: makhorka, table grapes, citrus fruits, common onions, garlic, and

seeds for alfalfa, clover and cereal grasses; while for 1987-1990 it excludes tobacco, makhorka and eggs. Starting in 1986 markups will be paid for peas, even if overall grain sales levels were not exceeded, but starting in 1987 brewing barley will be excluded from the list of grain crops to which this markup payment procedure applies.

Markups for cereal grass seeds will be paid according to the assortment list specified by contract.

The payment of markups stimulating increases in grain sales to the state should be discussed in particular. Practical experience in paying such markups during the 11th Five-Year Plan showed that in crop production zones where commercial grain is produced in smaller amounts and is of lower quality than in zones specializing in grain production farms' earnings from grain sales markups were a large share of earnings from this product's sales. Therefore, in allocating grain purchases based upon norms for union and autonomous republics, krais and oblasts it is necessary to focus attention upon setting equally taut plans for grain sales to the state. If this requirement is not fully taken into account some markups will be paid to farms not specializing in grain production, while in the main grain growing regions there will be increased differences in earnings, depending upon weather conditions.

In order to increase the interest of kolkhozs and sovkhos and other agricultural enterprises in producing sunflowers, soybeans and sugar beets it is foreseen, beginning with the 1986 harvest, to sell them in return for each quintal of the following products sold to the state, the following items:

Pervenets sunflowers (and other varieties) -- 40 kg of seed meal (cake) and 20 kg of mixed feeds; other varieties of sunflowers -- 10 kg seed meal (cake) and 20 kg of mixed feeds; and for amounts sold above the average level attained in the 11th Five-Year Plan, 30 kg of meal (cake) and 20 kg of mixed feeds;

Soybeans -- 30 kg of seed meal (cake) and 50 kg of mixed feeds;

Sugar beets -- 1.5 kg of syrup, 1 kg of mixed feeds and 60 kg of pulp residues, and for that sold above the average level attained in the 11th Five-Year Plan -- 5 kg of syrup, 2 kg of mixed feeds and 80 kg of pulp residues.

Compared to previously existing procedures, in the new one there are more substantial changes in norms for the return sales of meal and cake. These norms have been increased, permitting kolkhozes and sovkhos to improve the protein balance in feeds, reduce feed consumption per unit of animal products and to improve production efficiency. Farms are required to obtain (on schedule) all meal (cake) and other types of feed sold at subsidized prices. In order to meet this requirement, procurers' material responsibilities to farms will be enhanced. The use of these feed resources in violation of contracts is not permitted.

Return sales of mixed feeds (based upon standard norms) to farms in exchange for seeds delivered between republics are retained for the 12th Five-Year Plan. The assortment of the other types of agricultural products and norms for return sold mixed feeds will be set by union republic Councils of Ministers, based upon mixed feeds stocks put at their disposal.

During 1987-1990 markups will be paid on agricultural products sold to the state by low profit and money losing kolkhozes, sovkhoses and other agricultural enterprises working under poor natural-economic conditions. Their size and payment procedure have been established previously, in accordance with decisions made at the May (1982) CPSU Central Committee Plenum. When necessary, and upon request by RAP0's, the Councils of Ministers of autonomous republics, krayispolkoms and oblispolkoms have simultaneously been authorized to change the list of farms receiving markups, and to change the size of markups by farm group and product type. It is also deemed advisable to centralize, in union republic gosagroproms, up to 10 percent of the resources allocated for these purposes in order to help to farms operating in especially difficult conditions. The centralization of part of the markups requires reexamining the list of farms, the size of markups by farm group and product type in most union and autonomous republics, krays and oblasts, taking into account the differentiation (after the May (1982) Plenum) in the profitability of farms receiving markups or for which they were not established.

In solving questions of markup redistribution great importance is placed upon norms taking into account the economic evaluation of land, the availability of fixed productive capital, labor and other resources. Of course, it is necessary to include the actual level of overall farm profitability during the time these markups were used (1983-1985). The normative-resource approach to evaluating their productive potential makes it possible to distinguish those kolkhozes and sovkhoses which are in fact working under poor natural-economic conditions from those whose low production and economic indicators are due to poor work by collectives. With this approach to the distribution of markups one can more effectively and selectively implement specific measures for each low profit rate and money losing farm. This guarantees accelerated increases in agricultural output, reductions in nonproductive outlays and production costs.

Taking into account specific natural and economic conditions in oblasts, krays, autonomous or union republics helps solve questions in resource centralization not only through a general reexamination of the size of markups for various product types and farm groups, but also helps reduce markups for various products or eliminates them for farms with substantially improved profitability in recent years. The second direction for resource centralization might bring more results and be less laborious than the first. In both cases it is necessary to use a calculation methodology retaining part of the resources for these purposes, or, on the other hand, not creating conditions under which oblasts, krays or republics would require additional resources exceeding the increase in commercial products sold to the state. The total sum of markup payments for low profit or money losing farms is based on the planned volume of state purchases from these farms in 1986. When necessary the reexamination of farms and the size of markups in subsequent years in the 12th Five-Year Plan should be based upon planned purchase volume during the

year the reexamination occurs. These markups should be introduced at a time not requiring recalculations with procurers for the past period.

Specific directions for the use of centralized resources will be determined by union republic gosagroproms. Obviously, it is advisable that most of these resources remain at the disposal of gosagroproms at autonomous republics and agro-industrial committees at krais and oblasts for use in subsequent measures: covering planned losses from the sales of various products, for example, vegetable growing and beekeeping at specialized farms; paying off unsecured Gosbank loans; covering share contributions to interfarm enterprises or eliminating bottlenecks in production; for social-cultural measures, etc. It is necessary to assure such an accounting for these resources at kolkhozes and sovkhoses so that they are not distributed as profits. This includes those not used for material incentives or payments to the budget.

The question arises: for what products sold by low profit and money losing farms should markups be paid if, during the 12th Five-Year Plan, procedures for including products towards state purchase plan fulfillment are changed? Above all, this applies to products sold at purchase prices by enterprises and organizations entrusted with state procurement functions, and to livestock, poultry and milk purchased from the population by consumer cooperative organizations directly or through kolkhozes and sovkhoses and counted towards the farm's fulfillment of plans for sales to the state. In 1986 consumer cooperative organizations pay markups for livestock and poultry purchased from low profit and money losing farms or which they purchased from the population. These cooperatives will subsequently be compensated by USSR Gosbank institutions. These same organizations pay markups to farms for heavier young cattle purchased on contract from private citizens' plots.

It should be noted that in calculating total markups paid to farms for sales above average levels attained during the 11th Five-Year Plan, markups to low profit or money losing farms are not included. Also, total markups paid to such farms are not included in the total for the first markups.

A fundamental feature of measures to improve the economic mechanism for the country's APK is the more complete implementation of democratic centralism in price formation. This is reflected in the expansion of the rights and strengthening of the responsibilities of republic, kray and oblast state management organs, including those for the agro-industrial complex's direct management, and in the setting of scientifically based prices for agriculture.

Union republic Councils of Ministers have been given the right, upon agreement with USSR Gosagroprom and USSR Goskomsen [State Committee on Prices] and when necessary, to change purchase prices for agricultural products within the limits of total payments in the planned purchase volume. This helps strengthen the stimulation of zonal and intrazonal specialization, the introduction of intensive technology into agriculture and takes into account local conditions for production and sales. In preparing the appropriate proposals the indicated total payments do not include markups for above average sales or markups for low profit or money losing farms. However, the proposed changes in purchase

prices for some agricultural products should not lead to losses or overpayments in the form of markups for low profit or money losing farms.

In order to reduce fruit and vegetable losses and to actively assist in reducing kolkhoz market prices, union and autonomous republic gosagroproms' and kray and oblast agro-industrial committees have been authorized to set retail prices for vegetables, fruits, grapes, potatoes, melons, greens and other perishable products sold through subordinate stores. Data from the Russian Federation show the great importance of this measure. About 50 percent of fruit and vegetables and about 40 percent of potatoes are now sold through the Republic Gosagroprom trade network. In a number of cities an even higher share of total fruits, vegetables and potatoes are sold through the system.

Retail prices for fruits and vegetables are worked out and approved by gosagroproms and agro-industrial committees in charge of stores, independently of their location. Retail prices should reflect outlays for production, storage and sales, quality, supply and demand, and, as a rule, be lower than prices for similar products at local kolkhoz markets, but not be higher than consumer cooperative prices. This same procedure for setting retail prices for fruits and vegetables sold through subordinate stores is also used for products hauled in from other republics, krays and oblasts, including those which are part of funded deliveries or the result of contracted exchanges of foodstuffs.

Thus, within a given territory a single product can have four levels of retail prices: state trade, set by autonomous republic Councils of Ministers, oblast or kray ispolkoms; USSR Gosagroprom trade system; (consumer) cooperative system; and the kolkhoz market. In principle, fruit and vegetable retail prices approved by APK management organs can become the most active, because production and delivery to customers is concentrated in these organs' hands.

Practical steps by union and autonomous republic gosagroproms, kray and oblast agroproms to improve prices for the above products should consist in the following: Based upon documentation, fruit and vegetables retail price lists should be approved for union (without oblast divisions) and autonomous republics, krays and oblasts, with the symbol "APK" added to the list. Retail prices for potatoes, fruit and vegetables can be specified at levels established by Councils of Ministers of union republics (without oblast divisions) and autonomous republics and oblast and kray ispolkoms, or they can deviate from them in any direction. The approval of such prices by the appropriate management organs in the agro-industrial complex is mandatory: putting them into effect begins with approval according to the additional price list.

In order to assure operationality in the approval of retail prices, it is not advisable for the gosagroprom or agro-industrial committee to publish its order as each additional price list appears. However, for each union or autonomous republic gosagroprom or kray or oblast agro-industrial committee the order specifies additional officials who have the right to approve additional price lists. First of all, these should be the deputy chairman for economics in the gosagroprom or committee. In large territories it is

advisable to give the right to approve retail price lists to chairmen of rayon agro-industrial associations, trade association managers and directors of firm stores. This especially applies to the operational determination of prices for greens, fruits and vegetables which have highly seasonal delivery patterns.

APK management organs approving retail prices for fruit and vegetables are given responsibility for supplying all interested enterprises and organizations with information on prices introduced or replaced. This requires promptly printing additional price lists, a precisely organized system for dispatching them and the appointment of people to do this work. All price change decisions made must be reported to the State Committees on Prices in the union (without oblast divisions) or autonomous republics or price departments in autonomous republic Councils of Ministers or kray or oblast ispolkoms.

To increase the interest of agricultural and other USSR Gosagroprom system enterprises in processing fruit, vegetables, wild fruits, berries, mushrooms and other products and in producing new types of food products demanded by the public (juices, fruit drinks, jams, candies, canned goods, and others), they have been authorized to sell these products through subordinate stores at incentive prices set by the agro-industrial committees of oblasts and krays, gosagroproms of autonomous republics and union republics (without oblast divisions). Up to 50 percent of the profits obtained from such products are to be allocated to the fund for social-cultural measures.

Prices for new products should be approved not later than one month after the appropriate proposal has been made. We are talking here about processed products, upon which higher sanitary requirements are made upon indicators such as processing method, shelf life, packaging, possibility for combined use of some types of raw materials, etc. Both the production technology and the consumption of such products must be tested. Also, one month is the maximum time for approving incentive prices. Beyond such time it is impossible to check the degree to which the product meets all requirements. The new types of industrially processed food products for which union and autonomous republic gosagroprom and kray and oblast committees are authorized to approve incentive prices should include those for which normative-technical documentation (GOST [State standard], OST [Sector standard], TU [Technical condition], RTU [Republic technical standard]) have been approved in the established procedure, but which for some reason have not been produced in quantities sufficient to meet public demand.

Giving farms themselves the right to determine the use of above plan agricultural production helps strengthen the raw material base for the production of industrial food products, a basic condition for expanding their assortment. Such products can be produced by enterprises canning fruit and vegetables, wild fruits and berries, dried fruits, various types of meat, dairy and semi-processed products. In essence, these possibilities for setting retail prices for processed products mean the wide assignment of rights which are now enjoyed by the "Kuban" Agro-Industrial Complex. The procedure for determining and approving prices for industrially produced foodstuffs and retail prices for fruits, vegetables and other perishables should be the same.

If processed products are to be delivered to subordinate stores in other republics, krais or oblasts, then their prices are set by the supplier agroprom, upon agreement with the agroprom on whose territory the stores are located. This is because similar products can be sold in other stores at prices set by local agroproms when they are purchased on contract in other agroproms and by consumer cooperatives.

Due to the need to transport such products through union republics or the entire country, and to standardize prices for a given product in various regions, in some cases it is possible for union republic gosagroproms or USSR Gosagroprom to coordinate these prices.

Thus, the USSR Council of Ministers and CPSU Central Committee Decree on further improvements in the economic mechanism of the country's APK, foresees, on the one hand, initiatives by agroproms producing products, suppliers, agroprom consumers, and consumer cooperatives, entrepreneurialism and trading capabilities in each group; while on the other -- the establishment of multilateral production ties between agroproms and consumer cooperatives to supply the population with foodstuffs. In particular, this should be manifested through mutual coordination of approved prices.

It should be noted that contracts for mutual deliveries of foodstuffs by agroproms -- and they, obviously, will perform the functions of contracting parties, themselves should specify the assortment, quality, type of freight rate, delivery dates, method of accounts and responsibility of parties for delivery. Mutual contracts between union and autonomous republics, krais and oblasts can also be used for deliveries of potatoes, vegetables, melons, fruits, berries, table grapes in fresh or processed form of up to 30 percent of planned output authorized for the kolkhoz and sovkhos or other agricultural enterprise for sales to consumer cooperative organizations and at kolkhoz markets at contracted prices and counted towards plan fulfillment.

These products can be sold during the year (any time during the season), that is, practically from the beginning of the harvest, using up to 30 percent of the gross harvest for these purposes. Depending upon the volume of products the parties ship, their sales at contract prices can exceed the norm for some periods. However, within the limits of the plan, the 7 to 3 ratio between sales volumes by enterprises and organizations entrusted with the functions of state purchaser of agricultural products and those at contract prices should be observed. When selling some of the products at farms' discretion, it is impermissible for them not to fulfill obligations for volume, deadlines and assortment in accordance with forward contracts, and in some cases, delivery contracts.

Negative phenomena are possible in product sales on kolkhoz markets. Additional difficulties and misconduct might arise in trade organization. However, farms should do everything possible, based on material interests in improving the local population's supplies, to intensify their influence upon reducing kolkhoz market prices not only in areas where products are produced on a large scale, but also where they are consumed in large amounts -- cities and industrial centers. This trade's organization should be started by

determining the trade points at kolkhoz markets and the creation of the necessary material base. So that a wide assortment of goods will always be for sale at trade points, several farms should go about organizing trade. It is necessary to move from episodic participation in work with such markets to systematic trade. In doing this, agroproms and RAPOs should take local organizational and practical conditions into account. Organized trade at kolkhoz markets using registered retail prices is a first condition for preventing price misconduct and in delivering products to their intended place. Kolkhoz and sovkhos participation in kolkhoz markets can have an effective influence upon improving the quality and diversity of products offered to consumers.

There is an understandable question about product sales volume for which contracts must be signed with organizations performing state procurement functions. This mostly applies to perishable fruits and vegetables. They cannot all be sold at kolkhoz markets near production sites. Because of their weak material and technical base consumer cooperatives cannot purchase them on contract in the needed volume, whereas supplying them to state procurement organizations creates complete guarantees for farms. A solution to this question depends entirely upon APK management organs. In solving it they should take the following into consideration.

Farms are fined for not fulfilling obligations to sale products covered by forward contract. References to weather conditions will increasingly loose their force. At the same time, in attaching procurers to farms consideration must be given to the local market's size and to consumer cooperatives' real potentials. Also, some farms might prefer to independently ship products to customers. Careful thought must be given to all this. In any case, local APK management organs should, within the limits of available potentials, include within their plans the complete supply of the local population with products and the satisfaction of consumer cooperative orders for products at contracted prices. If the possibility for selling products through these two channels exceeds 30 percent of the planned volume for all commercial output, then a contract must be signed with procurers for 70 percent of it, and in some cases for 70 to 100 percent. Under no conditions can a farm get into a situation in which its plan for the sales of fruits, vegetables and other perishables is not supported by planned customers. It is also necessary to keep in mind that if farms' sales at contract prices exceed 30 percent of planned volume, the amount over 30 percent will not be counted towards fulfilment of the plan for that product's sales to the state.

As far as above plan output is concerned, its use is determined by the farm itself on the basis of economic studies revealing the sales channels most advantageous to kolkhozes and sovkhos. They can sell above plan potatoes, vegetables, melons, fruits, berries, table and industrial varieties of grapes, citrus fruits, dried fruits, honey, grain, oilseed crops, livestock, poultry, milk and eggs at contract prices to consumer cooperative organizations, kolkhoz markets and through their own stores. These are counted towards farm fulfillment of plans for sales to the state. Industrial crops (sugar beet roots, cotton, tobacco, makhorka, fibers, etc), animal products used as raw materials by processing industries (wool, hides, furs, silk cocoons, etc) should be purchased by enterprises and organizations entrusted with state procurement functions at prices and under conditions stipulated in forward contracts.

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

UZBEK OFFICIAL REVIEWS AGROPROM EFFECTIVENESS

Tashkent EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN in Russian No 10, Oct 86 pp 43-48

[Article by V. Antonov, minister of the Uzbek SSR and 1st deputy chairman of Gosagroprom UzSSR: "Agroprom: A Sense of the Forward Line"]

[Text] In the Political Report to the 27th Party Congress, the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev stated: "The task which we must solve within a brief period of time consists of satisfying completely the country's requirements for food goods. The party's modern agrarian program, formulated in the decisions handed down during the May 1982 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and in the USSR Food Program, is directed towards achieving this goal."

In the development of the agrarian sector of the republic's economy, an important role is played by the decisions handed down during the 21st Congress of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan. Our republic's agroindustrial complex accounts for more than 40 percent of the fixed productive capital, for more than one half of the gross product of Uzbekistan and it is here that 45 percent of the population is working in the national economy.

During the past 11th Five-Year Plan alone, almost 15 billion rubles were invested in the development of the republic's agrarian sector, the kolkhozes and sovkhozes were supplied with 80,000 tractors and many other items of equipment and the deliveries of mineral fertilizers and other logistical resources were increased considerably.

But as emphasized during the 21st Congress of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, the results achieved on the whole in developing agricultural production throughout the republic were unsatisfactory. The tasks for selling raw cotton, grain, milk, meat and eggs to the state were not fulfilled. There was a shortfall in output amounting to 1.3 billion rubles, the yield in products per ruble of productive capital declined and a reduction took place in the return per irrigated hectare. The existing situation in our main branch of production -- cotton production -- in addition to the negative phenomena and mistakes which have taken place, is explained by the unsatisfactory status of the land, by violations of the scientific principles of farming, by slow mastering of cotton-alfalfa crop rotation plans, by

serious shortcomings in the organization of seed production work, by crude violations in the use of cotton varieties and other reasons.

This is why the problem concerned with improving administration within the agro-industrial complex is considered to be of special importance in our republic. Economic conditions must be created which will stimulate interest in the kolkhozes, sovkhoses and other enterprises of the agro-industrial complex in increasing the production of products needed by society and improving their quality, such that they will have more income and be able to carry out their economic work based upon the principles of self-support and self-financing. In this regard, a requirement exists for raising the authority of a plan, achieving more efficient use of the entire array of market relationships and such economic levers as price, credit, profit and profitability.

As already mentioned above, the goal in improving the economic mechanism, while strengthening centralized management in the principal strategic directions, is that of simultaneously creating conditions for the extensive use of economic methods of administration, decentralizing a portion of the functions, transferring their fulfillment over from a republic to oblasts and from oblasts to rayons and, most important, raising the independence of enterprises and organizations, providing them with an expanse for economic maneuvering, creativity, initiative and socialist enterprise and achieving a more optimum combination of state interests with the interests of enterprises, labor collectives and individual workers.

As emphasized in the decisions handed down during the 27th CPSU Congress: "In the final analysis, everything that we do aimed at improving administration and planning and reorganizing organizational structures is directed towards creating conditions for effective work by the principal element of the economic system -- an association or enterprise."

For the purpose of raising the operational efficiency of the country's agro-industrial complex and the successful implementation of the USSR Food Program, considerable importance is attached to effective coordination among enterprises and organizations within the Gosagroprom [State Agroindustrial Committee] system. In the process, one is guided by the following common approaches, applicable to all enterprises and organizations within the APK [agro-industrial complex] regardless of the nature of their activity (agricultural, processing, service).

All agricultural enterprises within a rayon must be included in the structure of a rayon agro-industrial association. Moreover, kolkhozes, sovkhoses and inter-farm agricultural enterprises (excluding highly specialized breeding and other enterprises) are included in a RAPO [rayon agro-industrial association] structure in terms of all of their activities, that is, they are directly subordinate to the RAPO.

Agricultural enterprises and organizations and experimental stations which carry out tasks of an inter-rayon and oblast nature (seed production, breeding, fruit crop nurseries and others) are subordinate to corresponding associations and administrative organs of oblast agro-industrial committees.

Highly specialized agricultural enterprises are included in a RAPO based upon coordination of their operations. In matters of technical and technological policy, they are directly subordinated to corresponding specialized elements or administrative organs of an agroprom [agroindustrial committee] at the appropriate level (USSR Ptitseprom, All-Union Association for the Production, Procurements and Marketing of Seed for Vegetable Crops and Potatoes, All-Union Association of Breeding Plants and others).

In this regard, we cannot accept as being correct the efforts by a number of local agroprom organs, which for various reasons are striving (and unfortunately succeeding on many occasions) to convert highly specialized enterprises, seed production, breeding and other similar type enterprises over to being directly subordinate to a RAPO in terms of all of their diverse activities. As a result of such practice, the mentioned enterprises can be transformed into conventional commodity multiple-branch farms. The peculiarities associated with the development of experimental farms and stations are also not taken into account in this regard. They are viewed as being conventional rank and file farms. They are provided with raised plans for the sale of marketable products. This lowers the effectiveness and level of scientific studies, it disrupts the carrying out of plans for the production of seed of high reproductions and the raising of animals and so forth.

At the same time, the practice of creating new organs of administration in the absence of sufficient technical-economic justification and the withdrawal of the better agricultural enterprises from RAPO subordination also appears to be incorrect.

At the present time, the kolkhozes and sovkhoses are the primary elements of agro-industrial production and objects of administration. In the future, other organizational forms of production will be developed. One such form is that of agricultural enterprises of the industrial type (poultry factories, hothouse combines and others), the activities of which for all practical purposes are not associated with the use of agricultural lands.

A need exists at the present time for creating new agro-industrial enterprises (sovkhos-plants and kolkhoz-plants), which organically combine production and the processing of agricultural products, in many rayons using medium and small enterprises and departments and also in the raw material zones of the kolkhozes and sovkhoses. Such enterprises can be created by organizing departments for the processing and storage of products directly on the farms. Experience has underscored the high effectiveness of such organizational forms and thus the local agroprom organs must devote the required amount of attention to developing and improving them.

Agricultural production associations constitute still another promising organizational form for production and one which is associated with the effective use of production-economic potential. Kolkhozes and sovkhoses which are similar in terms of specialization or production structure and which have adjoining tracts of land are included in such associations. The latter fact is of extreme importance, since if the farms have a common territorial

character the production associations may appear not only as a production economic but also as a special-economic organism.

This will make it possible to improve the organizational-production structure of a rayon APK, eliminate to a definite degree its cumbersome nature and, at the same time, correct certain bottlenecks in organizing the administration of this complex.

Within the APK structure, enterprises and organizations not only of an agricultural nature but also representing many other branches will participate in the production of agricultural output and products obtained from the processing of such output. In order to combine the efforts of these enterprises and organizations, it is considered advisable to employ them for the creation of formations on a so-called inter-departmental basis. Specialized agrarian-industrial associations could be such formations.

In actual practice, associations both for production and processing and for the marketing of individual types of products and for trading in them have undergone further development. Such production agrarian-industrial associations must be employed more extensively in the fruit and vegetable, meat, dairy and other product sub-complexes. As a rule, these will be specialized formations which can be created both at the rayon and oblast levels. The mentioned associations are a promising form for agro-industrial integration. Experience has shown that in small agro-industrial associations which operate on the basis of a single consolidated plan and which are directed by the staff of a leading enterprise, conditions are created for more efficient production organization, operational maneuvering of labor and financial resources is carried out, closer contacts are established among the enterprises and opportunities are created for further strengthening production specialization and concentration in all enterprises included in an association. In such associations, the advantages of integrated production are manifested more completely, the processes involved in the gradual drawing together of enterprises associated with different forms of socialist ownership are accelerated and more opportunities for solving social and cultural domestic problems are created.

In addition to production agro-industrial formations, other organizational forms for production and administration of a similar type are possible in actual practice. Thus a promising organizational form for production in field crop husbandry is that of industrial-production systems that specialize in the cultivation of individual agricultural crops. For example, in the cultivation of grain crops the industrial production of products is being carried out based upon cooperation among farms engaged in seed production and the cultivation of commodity grain, scientific research institutes, procurement, processing and service enterprises and organizations.

Scientific production associations are considered to be a high form for the integration of agro-industrial branches with science. The operational experience of NPO's [scientific production associations] reveals that they possess greater advantages compared to the existing organizational form for research and introductory work.

The creation of NPO's is an urgent task for our republic and especially in such areas as fruit and vegetable production and the food and meat and dairy industries.

Thus, depending upon the specific managerial conditions, the objects for APK administration can be various branch, inter-branch and territorial-branch organizational forms for production.

Improvements in production planning and the conversion over to a more progressive normative method must play a central role in achieving these goals. Here we have in mind the need for ensuring that planning at all levels is carried out taking into account an economic evaluation of the land and the availability of production capital and labor and other resources. Experience in such planning has been accumulated in a number of oblasts throughout the country. This system must now be mastered throughout our republic's entire agro-industrial complex.

An important aspect is that of converting over to grain procurement plans, at the level for the 1986 plan, which were stable throughout the years of the 12th Five-Year Plan.

For the sale of grain in excess of the average annual level for the 11th Five Year Plan, a 100 percent bonus is being established for farms which overfulfilled their procurement plans. Automobiles, tractors and other material resources which are in high demand will be sold to these farms in the form of incentives -- in addition to the funds.

For the republic and oblasts, commencing in 1987, no procurement plans will be assigned for meat, milk, eggs, potatoes, vegetables, melon crops, fruit, berries, table grapes or dried fruit products, but rather firm delivery plans are being established for these products by years of the five-year plan and also centralized funds (or subsidies from them). Following the fulfillment of these tasks, the remaining products will be available for internal consumption.

All of this is directed towards developing the initiative of local organs and, at the same time, imposing upon them greater responsibility for the fulfillment of plans.

The union republics are authorized to differentiate the level of procurement prices for all types of agricultural products by zones and groups of farms. The conversion over to scientifically sound planning for agricultural product procurements and logistical support for farms, based upon technical-economic norms combined with authorizing the republic to differentiate the purchase prices, is creating objective opportunities for equalizing the economic conditions for the management of rayons, kolkhozes and sovkhoses operating under different natural-climatic conditions.

Great changes are planned by the party and government in the area of capital construction.

Commencing next year, the plans for capital construction and for introducing capabilities and fixed capital into operations must be developed by the kolkhozes and sovkhozes themselves within their capital investment limits. The farms can carry out above-limit construction while searching for their own funds and material resources.

During the 21st Congress of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, it was stated quite fairly that the republic has fallen seriously behind in solving socio-cultural and domestic problems in the rural areas. A considerable number of rural populated points lack public health facilities, only 35 percent are equipped with water supply and sewerage systems and there is an acute shortage of housing and children's pre-school facilities. In view of this fact, a comprehensive program is presently being developed for the social development of the rural areas during the 12th Five-Year Plan and for the period up to the year 2000. This is a large program the solving of which will require the efforts of the entire republic.

The authority of leaders of enterprises and Gosagroprom [State Agroindustrial Committee] organs in the matter of approving planning-estimates documentation is being expanded. The plans call for enterprises to be allocated material resources for operational-repair needs and construction, to be carried out using the economic method and in accordance with the norms.

Great opportunities are opening up at the present time. It is important that they be utilized in an intelligent manner -- in the interests of the state and the labor collectives. There is still one very basic problem -- the principle of planning based upon the level achieved must be rejected in a decisive manner. Up until recently, the oblasts, rayons and farms were provided with tasks calling for the same percentage of growth: a backward rayon or farm was required to carry out its tasks at the same tempo as a leading element. Resources were allocated on the basis of this method. As a result, the distance between leading and backward elements did not decrease but rather it increased.

An improvement in the economic mechanism of management requires the continuation, throughout the 12th Five-Year Plan, of the system of adding bonuses to the procurement prices for low profitability and unprofitable farms. Our republic is being allocated 165 million rubles for this purpose. However, it should be borne in mind that the farms are issued such compensation owing to the fact that they operate under poor natural-climatic conditions and not for the purpose of covering a low level of management. Thus the oblast agroproms and RAPO's must implement a complex of measures aimed at achieving more efficient use of the resources allocated to low profitability and unprofitable farms.

In the interest of improving the financial status of enterprises and organizations of the agro-industrial complex, a decision was handed down concerning the deferment, for a period of 10 years, of repayments for Gosbank loan indebtedness in the amount of 30 billion rubles for the country as a whole and 1.406 billion rubles for our republic. This great amount of assistance furnished by the state must be utilized in a rational manner.

Comrade M.S. Gorbachev emphasized the following point during the 27th CPSU Congress: "True cost accounting, the dependence of the income of enterprises upon the final results, must become the norm for all elements of the agro-industrial complex and particularly kolkhozes and sovkhoses."

For the next two years, the task has been assigned of converting mainly all kolkhozes and sovkhoses over to complete cost accounting and ensuring their profitable operation.

If reductions are to be realized in expenditures and output costs and if a conversion is to be carried out over to a self-supporting basis, then all of the production sectors of kolkhozes and sovkhoses must be converted over not to formal but to genuine cost accounting operations, they must be assigned tasks for output quantity and quality and expenditure limits for the production of goods and they must be aware of the reward they will receive for their final results. In addition to stimulating the labor collectives towards improving the results of their work, the plans also provide for material responsibility for mismanagement and overexpenditures of resources per unit of output.

In conformity with the established system, 70 percent of the savings realized can now be paid out in the form of incentives and overexpenditures can be reimbursed using funds set aside for wages or the bonus fund.

In addition to providing a savings in the use of resources, cost accounting also provides a strict comparison of expenses against income and an optimum distribution of the funds for savings and consumption. Unfortunately, in recent years the kolkhozes and sovkhoses in many of the republic's oblasts and rayons have assigned a large portion of the increase in income to the consumption fund. On the whole, at kolkhozes throughout the republic, the rate of increase in withholdings for the consumption fund is twice as high as the rate of increase in savings.

Many farms have even used income obtained as a result of bonuses added on to prices not for developing production but for consumption, spending such income for wages without taking into account the growth in labor productivity. As a result, it turned out that the wages at unprofitable kolkhozes were 20 percent higher than at kolkhozes which had a profitability of from 15 to 20 percent.

Tremendous reserves for improving the economy are to be found in the use of collective and family contracts. Experience reveals that the cropping power of fields and animal productivity are 20-25 percent higher and labor productivity is twice as high for contractual collectives than for collectives which operate on the basis of the old method.

We must achieve a situation wherein a collective contract becomes the predominant form for labor organization and wages. Emphasis must be placed upon the final results achieved by a farm, including its leaders and specialists.

An extremely important aspect is the fact that cost accounting and the new progressive forms for organizing wages are most effective in those areas where

fine control has been established over expenditures. Experience has shown that an efficient form of mutual accounts is the best means for achieving such control. And this method must be introduced into operations in all areas.

The results must be summarized and publicized monthly and in some areas once every 10 days. This will aid in eliminating in a timely manner those factors which cause overexpenditures of resources and it will also encourage zealous labor collectives.

The Food Program is being solved not only in the field. If, for example, more than one third of the potatoes grown and 20-30 percent of the vegetables are lost while enroute to the consumer, then thought must be given to the best path to be followed: expand the sowing areas at a tremendous cost or create conditions under which, through a reduction in losses, an increase will take place in the product being produced.

A need exists for carrying out a number of measures for reinforcing cost accounting, aimed primarily at strengthening the relationship between wages and final results, increasing production and raising its efficiency and increasing the integration processes between kolkhozes and sovkhozes on the one hand and their partners on the other. In order to strengthen the cost accounting principles, link them more closely to collective contracts and make a contract continuous in nature, a new wage system will be introduced for leading workers and farm specialists and workers, in accordance with stable rates (norms) for the output realized (gross). Appropriate changes have been introduced into the wages for workers. The farms have been authorized, based upon specific production conditions, to make extensive use of family and personal contracts in field crop husbandry and animal husbandry as forms of the collective contract. The leaders of enterprises are permitted to issue up to 25 percent of the products obtained over and above the volume called for in a contract to workers attached to contractual collectives in the form of payments in kind.

The measures called for in the decree of the party and government require a strengthening of the economic services and improvements in planning-economic work at all administrative levels.

However, it bears mentioning that some oblagroproms [oblast agroindustrial committees] and RAPO's have still not reorganized their thinking along economic lines, they are carrying out their production operations using antiquated methods and in the final analysis they expect all expenditures, regardless of their nature, to be covered by the state. A definite number of leaders and specialists have mastered to only a negligible degree the existing wage conditions, the principles of cost accounting and collective contracts and the methods employed in the planning and financing of enterprises. They expect this work to be handled by economists and bookkeepers.

In view of the present situation with regard to labor resources, the extensive approach for management is in sharp conflict with the culture of production and is becoming incompatible with the new conditions. However, this circumstance is not always being taken into account in production planning.

And success cannot be expected in this matter in the absence of improvements being carried out.

Over the past 3 years, the level of mechanization in cotton production has not increased and there has even been a decline in the mechanized harvesting of the crop, despite the fact that the kolkhozes and sovkhoses have an adequate machine-tractor pool at their disposal. In 1985, of 36,000 cotton harvesting machines which were available during the harvest period, not more than 16,000-20,000 were in operation. The output per machine amounted to an average of 61 tons and overall the machines harvested only 37 percent of the crop. Such labor-intensive technological operations as combating weeds, thinning out of cotton seedlings, foliar waterings and gathering up cotton from the ground are still being carried out manually in cotton production.

At the same time, a number of machines and implements which have successfully undergone all types of testing and which have been recommended for series production are still not being produced. This includes machines for the removal of weed rhizomes, cotton stem puller-grinders and machines for the mechanization of horticulture, viticulture and vegetable and melon production.

In the interest of further improving agriculture in our republic, decisive importance is attached to improving the water management system and to carrying out land reclamation work. By no means are we making full use of our irrigation farming potential. Can we really continue to tolerate a situation in which the republic has approximately 600,000 hectares of land considered to be unfavorable from a reclamation standpoint, the return from which is extremely low? A considerable number of collectors, drains and water holes are not ensuring the maintenance of a favorable regime. Many tracts of developed land lack engineering-technical support and adequate housing facilities. All of this is inhibiting the formation of stable collectives at virgin land sovkhoses.

It should be borne in mind that the water resources of the Syr-Darya and Amu-Darya river basins are near exhaustion and thus a requirement exists for firm discipline in the use of water and for radical improvements in the operation of aquicultural systems. We have many other problems requiring solutions. Thus today, as never before, there must be desire and ability to utilize new developments in an economically intelligent and creative manner.

The principal efforts must be directed towards strengthening state discipline, order and organizational ability, such that next year, as required by the party, will be a turning point in the work of sharply increasing the production of agricultural products and improving the supply of food products for the population. Boldness and innovation are required for implementing the Food Program in fulfillment of the decisions handed down during the 27th CPSU Congress.

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FUELS

TYUMEN OBLAST GROWTH, SHORTCOMINGS REVIEWED

Moscow EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA in Russian No 2, Jan 87 p 9

[Interview with Secretary of the Tyumen Oblast CPSU Committee Viktor Vasilyevich Kitayev by V. Shloma: "The Start After the Finish"]

[Text] Little more than a year has passed since the task, not only of eliminating the arrears to the country's that piled up during the 11th Five-Year Plan but also of achieving a stable operation that will promote recovery of hydrocarbon raw materials, was assigned to the West Siberian Oil and Gas Complex's working collectives.

How close have Tyumen Oblast communists come to the target set by the Party Central and the government? What was it possible to do in 1986, and with what kind of a backlog of work under way did the laboring collectives come to the second year of the five-year plan? Secretary of the Tyumen Oblast CPSU Committee Viktor Vasilyevich Kitayev tells about this in a conversation with our correspondent V. Shloma.

Viktor Vasilyevich Kitayev: I would like to begin with a statement of fact: in October 1986 the oblast's oil and gas industry came up to the level planned for the daily recovery of hydrocarbon raw materials, which will support an annual potential for growth by 37 million tons. This has not happened before in better times: the best achievement--36.2 million tons--was in 1977.

[Question] That growth actually is great. And how do things stand with making up the old arrears?

[Answer] Three Glavtyumenneftegaz [Main Administration of the Tyumen Oil and Gas Industry] associations and Tatneft collectives that worked at our fields did not carry out the annual plan. The overall shortfall was about 9.5 million tons. But thanks to an increase in recovery by other associations of the oblast, it was possible to reduce this gap, and at the end of 1986 we came up with smaller losses--5.8 million. The Noyabrneftegaz, Varyeganneftegaz and Purneftegaz associations and the Uryevneft administration should completely eliminate the lag in the near future.

It is not easy being a laggard. Especially if the "illness" becomes chronic in nature. We have tried to instill confidence in the laboring collectives and to convince people that Tyumen is still far from having exhausted its potential and will remain for many years the main oil and gas complex.

By achieving steady and rhythmic work, we shall be able to pay off the arrears to the state, as the calculations indicate, in the next year and a half.

[Question] What is this assurance based upon?

[Answer] I will say this: the party and state decree on questions of the integrated development of the oil and gas industry in West Siberia and Comrade M. S. Gorbachev's visit were powerful impulses toward accelerating the solution of our most important problems. This is first. Second--the oblasts have extended assistance that is actually enormous in scale in all areas, primarily in supplying equipment and establishing close ties with the machinebuilders.

Not by far do I paint today's situation in rosy hues. A multitude of questions have not been resolved, among which even the rhythmicity of deliveries and the quality of equipment are not, let's say, the most complicated. We should be talking right now about this equipment, which raises labor productivity not by a fraction of a percent but severalfold. This especially concerns drilling. We can provide for steady operation of the drillers in both summer and winter, but to this end the machinebuilders must meet the oil-field workers' needs and create heated drill rigs, the use of which allows labor productivity to be greatly increased.

It must be said that USSR Minkhimmash [Ministry of Chemical and Petroleum Machine Building] recently made the decision to reorient the Tyumen Plant for Forging and Pressworking Equipment to the production of oil and gas equipment. The possibility of reshaping other Tyumen plants to the manufacture of needed equipment that is effective in the Far North is being sought. Joint efforts will help us to complete the formation of our own base for machinebuilding in the shortest possible time, in order to stop the importation of needed equipment from, let's say, Baku.

[Question] It is understood that the assistance that the country is rendering the oil and gas complex today is of great significance, but nevertheless the laboring collectives and their party organizations are the main force, as was mentioned in the CPSU Central Committee decree about the organizational and political work of the Nizhnevartovsk City Party Committee on meeting state plans and socialist commitments for recovering oil. What response did this document get on the part of the oblast's communists?

[Answer] The Central Committee decree unveiled sharply, and from a standpoint based upon principles, serious deficiencies in the activity of the city party organization and also in the work of the oblast party committee.

This document became a restructuring program not only for Nizhnevartovsk's communists but also for all of us. Today there is not one brigade of drillers, repairmen or oilfield-facility workers which has not been visited by heads of the city party organization. Meetings and conversations with

foremen, brigade leaders and blue-collar workers have allowed no few reserves for increasing the daily recovery of raw material to be discovered.

The Nizhnevartovsk Oil and Gas Industry Association has restructured its work in earnest. New people who have come to its management know how not only to execute a complex of progressive technical and technological measures but also, together with the party organization, to involve the collective in organizing people in the new fashion for the job in the name of achieving the main goal. The Nizhnevartovskers completed the year 1986 successfully: they had 1½ million tons of fuel above the plan to their credit.

Today the communists of Varyeganneftegaz, who recover about 34 million tons of oil per year, are breaking away from outlived forms and methods. Since the first days of Glavtyumenneftegaz's development, the strategic error was made of considering that the required recovery volume could be obtained just by the rotating-duty method, without building a base city with the amenities. Even the oblast party committee did not correct the managers then. We know what this led to: the "flying" oil-recovery workers proved to be unequal to the task.

Reconstruction was started here by bringing the administrative staff geographically closer to the recovery site, creating a party committee, and intensifying supervision by experienced specialists and party workers from Nefteyugansk. New people who think in the modern way have appeared at all levels, beginning with the chief engineer and ending with the chiefs of the recovery departments.

They not only knew how to raise sharply the level of technological competence at the oilfield facilities, but they also began to analyze deeply the social and economic conditions for production. And back in January the Varyegansk collective reached the planned goal for daily output.

[Question] And what is the state of affairs in capital construction?

[Answer] Already there are some improvements. In 1986, 2.73 million square meters of housing were built. A fairly substantial rate of growth was reached here--more than 20 percent. The number of places in children's institutions rose by 40 percent.

Nevertheless, the conclusions that the communists drew recently at the oblast party committee plenum was disquieting: the attitude of party committees, soviet organs and economic supervisors toward the construction of housing and of facilities for the social sphere as something that is second priority still makes itself felt.

But it is clear to all that managers who are not concerned about people cannot count on success. The oblast party committee still has much restructuring to do on this question. Indeed, it was not so long ago that we ourselves gave incentives to or punished economic managers only for "gushers."

I would like to cite some examples. Glavtyumengeologiya chief F. Salmanov is well known in the oblast party organization. Wherever he works--as chief of the expedition in Surgut or Gornopravdinsk, or as chief of a main administration--he has always shown a caring attitude toward the people's working and

living conditions. But then there is M. Borodanov, chief of Tyumenstroyput [Tyumen Railroad Construction Association], whose collective, with truly heroic labor, is erecting most important railroad lines, has fallen behind with all its efforts in the integrated erection of spur tracks, river ports and airports. For 10 years the railroad station in Surgut and for two five-year plans the boiler operation maintenance base in Tobolsk have been in a state of "uncompleted construction." Major shortfalls in facilities for social purposes remain on the Surgut-Urengoy Railroad.

What kind of restructuring can the association talk about if even the meager 1986 plan for housing construction for their own workers has failed completely?

Unfortunately, similar reproaches can be directed toward the managers of Glavzapsibzhilstroy [Main Administration for Housing Construction in West Siberia] (the main administration chief of I. Varshavskiy) Zapsibenergostroy [Trust for the Construction of Power-Engineering Facilities in West Siberia] (the trust's chief is V. Vikulov), and others.

The problem of building up facilities for the people's use is closely associated with savings from earned income. Many of our collectives have been expanding inordinately. On the other hand, there are numerous cases of the nonrational use of the expeditionary rotating-crew method. For the prime costs for producing a ton of oil by the same Glavtyumenneftegaz is growing constantly because of the 35,000 constantly "flying" blue-collar workers and specialists.

In brief, we still have to get deeply to the heart of this. At the oblast party committee's next plenum we shall examine ways for solving the problems that face the oblast, not with numbers but with skill. We shall enlist the efforts of the scientists in order to analyze and develop the program.

[Question] Oilfield workers have repeatedly been subjected to criticism for serious faults in the work of the basic scientific subunits of the oblast's oil branch. As M. S. Gorbachev said in his address to the conference of party economic activists of Tyumen and Tomsk oblasts in September 1985, the industry's NII's [scientific-research institutes] at times are transformed into advocate offices for the agencies. That is, they do not advance science nor do they determine progress, but they search for scientific-sounding justifications for stagnation and for the nonexecution of what had been planned....

[Answer] This is actually so. I will cite two examples. I have been working in the oblast for 10 years on increasing formation productivity. It cannot be said that the time and money spent has been entirely in vain. But not one proposed method has yielded any appreciable result at all. And a second case. Several times a new design for building up the Fedorovskoye field's facilities has been examined, and, in essence, each time a new design has been developed. And in each case time has outraced the "bold" projects. And it outraced it because the designers were not able to scrutinize and evaluate the field's prospects with precision.

The management of Glavtyumenneftegaz and its prime institutes have determined the optimal paths for restructuring the existing operating system.

Scientific organizations were assigned the key problems of creating new operating processes for recovering raw-material reserves that are difficult to get at, improving and increasing the reliability of systems for gathering the crude and for transporting it within the fields, struggling with corrosion, creating technologies that save power and resources, and designing facilities that do not need constant tending personnel. The achievement of such indicators of effectiveness as the volume of additional recovery of crude by introducing new technologies, increasing well-operating time between repairs, reducing the time taken to build wells, and making more complete use of casing-head gas was made possible as a final result.

The Siberian Scientific-Research Institute for the Oil Industry has become the chief organization of Glavtyumenneftegaz for coordinating science. A council of institute directors has been created.

Science and production associations are still playing a more than modest role in introducing new developments. Their activity during the year of their existence did not go beyond the framework of those tasks which were decided by the individual structural subunits that now enter into the NPO's [science and production associations]. Without a scientific and experimental-test base, the Association for Equipment and Technology for Oil Recovery is still occupied with its own development, but it is time for it to become the legislator, so to speak, of engineering policy for both the branch's institutes and its production associations.

Of course the problem of coordinating scientific research and that of increasing the effectiveness of the branch's science cannot help but worry us. So, not long ago we enlisted as prime coordinator the Institute of Problems of Developing the North of the USSR Academy of Science's Siberian Division. Also created was a council for raising the level of party supervision over the acceleration of scientific and technical progress, under the party's oblast committee. Right now the development of a number of comprehensive programs in the process of whose realization we expect to receive output from both academic science and from the branch's science is being completed.

[Question] Viktor Vasilyevich, successes of the second year of the five-year plan will be occasioned greatly by the operating results of Tyumen's oil and gas complex, which occupies such an enormous place in the country's economy. What are the first-priority tasks?

[Answer] The main task is well known--the speediest elimination of the arrears in output, based upon a firm schedule, and increase in the output of hydrocarbon raw materials. How matters are going today can be seen from the diagram cited.

In 1987, 17 new fields are to be put into operation. We have basically changed the evaluation of this important matter. We have had to introduce not simply new fields but also their output. Therefore, we reviewed the schedule for building field facilities for the underground storehouses, and we have managed to begin their operation basically in the first half of the year.

- A. Oil recovery, thousands of tons per day.
- B. Chart of Planned and Actual Oil Recovery in Tyumen Oblast by Month of 1986.
- C. Planned daily recovery.
- D. Actual daily recovery.
- E. January, February, March, April, May, June, July, August, September, October, November and December


We shall enter the new year with a good backlog of well drilling. About 700,000 meters were penetrated above the plan in 1986. Today more than 10

drilling brigades, following the example of V. Sidoreyko's advanced collective, have penetrated as much as 100,000 meters in a year.

And something else must be said. Since the first of January, oilfield workers have converted to operation under the new economic mechanism. An analysis has indicated that growth in oil and gas recovery has been achieved until now mainly by the extensive path. The new economic mechanism, at the basis of which cost accounting lies, should lead to a real acceleration in the economic activity of oil and gas complex activities.

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CSO: 1822/074



FUELS

LEAD EDITORIAL CALLS FOR GREATER COAL OUTPUT

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Dec 86 p 1

[Editorial: "Underground Mine Horizons"]

[Text] Coal is on a par with metal in being called the bread of industry. Its role in the country's fuel and power balance will henceforth grow still more. The state of affairs in power engineering and metallurgy and the temperature in our housing will depend upon the miners' work. Coal's importance is being expanded as a raw material for the chemical industry, from which it obtains sulfur, plastics, paints, fertilizer and many other things.

The 12th Five-Year Plan assigns the coal miners the task of raising mining output by more than 67 million tons. When considering that growth was about 23 million tons in the two preceding five-year plan periods and that mine-geology conditions are becoming increasingly difficult, the solution of this task will not be easy.

The mining of the solid fuel in the Kansk-Achinsk, Ekibastuz, Kuznetsk and other coal basins, where it is planned to develop mining by the open-pit method at an overwhelming pace, is to increase greatly, but the primacy of the underground mines will be retained for a long time yet, since it is there that the most valuable types of coal are being mined. The mining of coal in underground mines can be raised only by accelerating integrated mechanization, by making more effective use of equipment, and by training better all grades of personnel.

Technology still has not become a reliable ally of the miners. Complication of mine-geology conditions did not occur all at once, or suddenly. Many years ago the designers and scientists undertook to create equipment units for mining coal in thin seams and sharply dipping seams. But at present the miners have at their disposal only a small number of modern machines. However, as before, the path from the idea to its embodiment in metal is intolerably long, and the road from display models to serial output is even more difficult. Some machinebuilding enterprises have proved themselves to be unprepared to convert to the production of new equipment. Thus, 9 years ago, at the Kuznetsk Underground Mine Zenkovskaya, the collective of one section sent to the top a fully loaded trainload of coal in a day from a sharply dipping seam. The record was set with the help of a new AK-3 unit. Since then a mere handful of units of this remarkable machinery has been produced, since

the Plant imeni Ivan Chernykh has not received reliable material support from USSR Minugleprom [Ministry of Coal Industry] and has not mastered series production of the unit.

Dozens of scientific-research and design organizations and coal machinebuilding enterprises have been subordinated to the industry's staff. Everything is in one pair of hands, but coordination in the work of the allied subbranches still is less than what had been agreed on. The central party press has called attention to these problems so many times! But, as before, many miners have to work with the miner's jackhammer. And the latter's quality leaves much to be desired, a fact that many delegates to the 27th CPSU Congress correctly spoke about. Only next year will the output of jackhammers of a higher technical level start. The branch's staff, designers and scientists, and machinebuilders must so restructure their work that they do not pursue the needs of the times but surpass and foresee them.

But the miners also have reserves whose realization does not require much capital investment. One is to make better use of existing equipment. Machine time of mechanisms at breakage faces does not exceed even 30 percent. Idle time of underground longwall miners because of accidents is great.

Often the very same units are used with different yield under the very same conditions. For example, in all the thousand-tonner and million-tonner brigades, without exception, high skill is combined with a thrifty and businesslike attitude toward the equipment. At present more than 400 such brigades each day send to the top 1,000 or more tons of coal each, 97 are waging a struggle to mine 500,000 tons of coal or shale per year, and 6 brigades and sections have in mind the million-tonner goal. In less than 5 months the brigades of V. Gvozdev from the Raspadskaya Underground Mine and V. Yelagin from the Oktyabrskaya in the Kuzbass [Kuznetsk Coal Basin] extracted half a million tons of coal each. V. Kuznetsov's brigade from Donets's Krasnolimanskaya Underground Mine took this same height in half a year. But the number of such brigades still grows slowly.

The advanced collectives' experience in organizing work, using machinery at maximum workload and indoctrinating miners in a thrifty attitude should be more widely propagated. Good work by the repair and preparation shifts, which permits idle time to be decreased and machine time at the mine faces to be increased, is a support for advanced workers. Sections have been created here for repairing equipment, the skill levels of these sections' blue-collar workers is constantly being raised, and a feeling of responsibility for high-quality and timely technical servicing has been created. In brief, there is still much to be learned. Party committees should strictly and unremittently monitor introduction of the progressive organization of production in all collectives.

Not just brigades and underground and strip mines are affected by restructuring. Control and methods of management in the industry are to be changed radically. The essence of these measures consists in expanding the limits of independence of associations and enterprises and in strengthening the tie between the results of the work and the development of production and of material incentives, as well as the solution of social tasks.

The Gukovugol, Krasnoarmeyskugol and Intaugol Associations have converted to the new management methods since last year. Already in the first year of operation by the new way, the level of mining has been raised and productivity and profits have risen in the associations. But, as with any new matter, they have their difficulties here: it still has not been possible to realize fully the associations' rights to use the funds for production and social development and those for constructing housing. Not all workers visualize the essence of the new management methods with sufficient precision. All these omissions must be eliminated immediately, since next year the whole coal-mining industry will transfer to the new management terms.

The industry's main job is to mine more coal, coal of better quality, and at less expense. The solution is tied in continuously with facilitation of the underground miners' labor and by the creation of safer conditions for the miners' difficult work. The lag suffered in past years requires that the branch's toilers increase their efforts to improve operations. There are no trifles in this great matter. Party committees and social organizations should aim their work at increasing the effectiveness of management and at raising the demands on supervisors for fulfillment of plans and socialist commitments for the first year of the five-year plan. Party and production discipline should be further strengthened at each working section and in each collective, and all orders for fuel should be fulfilled precisely, on time and with high quality.

The weekday rhythms of the miners' collectives right now determine the socialist competition for successful completion of the plan for this year and of the tasks for the first two years of the five-year plan by the 70th Anniversary of the Great October. The guarantees of successful achievement of the high goals are shockwork labor and constant searches for what is new, in order that speeding up may become an everyday matter.

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FUELS

GAS APPRAISAL HOLE FINDS OIL AT SAMBURG

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Nov 86 p 1

[Interview with Yevgrafiy Artemyevich Teplyakov, USSR Prize Winner and chief of the Administration for Oil and Gas Prospecting Operations of Glavtyumengeologiya, by Ye. Perepletkin (Tyumen): "Samburg's Oil Gusher"]

[Text] Tyumen Oblast's vast territory, almost 1½ million square kilometers in area, hides many still-undiscovered riches beneath its surface. Therefore, new oil and gas gushers have become for geologists a sort of everyday phenomenon. However, when an appraisal hole, No 700, suddenly "spoke up" with all its might, not far from an Urengoy gas giant, this stimulated a lively exchange of opinions among production workers and scientists

"The powerful gusher of liquid fuel struck from three horizons, where it was not at all possible to count on such a yield," chief of the Administration for Oil and Gas Prospecting and Exploration Operations and USSR State Prize Winner Ye. Teplyakov told us at Glavtyumengeologiya [Main Administration for Geological Operations in Tyumen Oblast]. "I will give some explanations. The '700' in the Samburg area is one of that category of deeper wells that we have drilled in the Yamal-Nenetsk Autonomous Okrug. The bottom hole is at 5,000 meters. The category itself tells about its design. It is an appraisal hole. That is, it was created in order to study as much as possible the parameters of the various geological structures. A large number of cores (rock samples) are studied at such holes, so the drilling is performed carefully and over a fairly long time--about a year.

"R. Malikov's brigade could consider the conclusion itself of the sinking of such a complicated bore a victory. But then the testers, under Ya. Pendrak, checked some deep horizons and obtained oil fluxes, albeit insignificant ones. What general joy there was when a gusher struck with such force at the 3,910-3,940 meter interval! It was as if this had occurred at one of the best fields of the Central Ob!

"The discovery is of fundamental importance. The oil came from sands of the so-called Achim member. Before hole No 700, we were all convinced that it could be considered productive only down to a certain depth. The unusual gusher made us realize that the 'oil floors' extend for a whole half-kilometer

deeper, and so a new field of activity was opened up for the geological explorers.

[Question] Yevgrafiy Artemyevich, does this event entail some kind of practical action on the part of the main administration? Or were the specialists restricted to the scientific establishment of a curious phenomenon?

[Answer] Theory is a necessary business, but life requires a realistic return. Primarily growth in oil reserves at the traditionally gaseous Yamal. For the present only one field of "black gold"--the Novoportovsk--is being prepared here for a buildup of oilfield facilities. But indeed crude has also been obtained at other fields. It's just that its quantity must be known with all certainty. Including also the region of "700." So now three more drill rigs will be sent here, and four brigades of the Upper Pura Expedition, including R. Malikov's collective, will begin to sink wells in order to determine where and in what manner the productive formations are distributed.

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FUELS

YAMBURG GAS OUTPUT INCREASES

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Dec 86 p 1

[Article by A. Trutnev, Mingazprom [Ministry of Gas Industry] Press Center correspondent (Yamburg-Moscow): "The Great Gas Giant of the North"]

[Text] Yamburg's gas-field workers are performing their difficult duty tour with honor. The new arctic field Rodina is yielding gas. Each day the figures on fuel sent to the mainland increases in the controller's journal of the Yamburggazdobycha Production Association.

Winter gains strength drastically in these regions. Snow forms drifts around the mobile housing. Wind from the Arctic Ocean rushes along over the Ob Gulf, driving before it ever newer and newer dull gray storm clouds.

The industrialized-construction method has been used and will be further developed at Yamburg. Primarily, there are modules. That is, large parts of future installations stuffed with all the necessary equipment. They can be erected in mere days.

Possibly, but not always. Often the quality of assembly is so low that everything has to be done all over again. And not in a warm factor department but in the tundra, which is open to all winds.

Yamburg has great plans, wide prospects....But already squabbling has started at the new field. We have spoken and written for decades about the lessons of Medvezhye and Urengoy. Yes, actually the lessons of management and mismanagement have taught us important things. Both Medvezhye and Urengoy were built up and duly yielded gas. But at what cost in strained effort and resources was this achieved?! Even now much remains undone at Urengoy, and even that veteran of the North, Medvezhye, still suffers from a lack of coordination and incompleteness of the work of various ministries and agencies. Operations are now being conducted at Yamburg, and the pioneers have gone on to Yamal. And from the very start there have been problems.

Fuel, for example. A shortage of it is being experienced, primarily at enterprises of Minenergo [Ministry of Power and Electrification] itself. But the Yamburg storehouse, which can provide a substantial portion of its requirements through its own resources, finds itself in the position of a poor relative of this ministry.

"Despite the repeated appeals by the gas-field workers, asking that the work of the power engineers at the field be rearranged," says General Director of the Yamburggazdobycha Production Association S. Pashin, "it is not being done in practice. It turns out that they do not want to make an effort even for themselves!"

The Yamburgers also have major complaints against Mintransstroy [Ministry of Transport Construction]. Its builders, in essence, missed all the plan deadlines for laying roads to the UKPG-1 [Integrated Gas-Treatment Installation No 1] and the first compressor station. Because of this, the drillers were not able to go out on time to the platforms assigned to them. And thus, like gears stuck together, evolving from cause into consequence, a general disruption of the major state program for developing Yamburg goes on.

Despite repeated announcements of Minkhimmash [Ministry of Chemical and Petroleum Machine Building] managers, the industrial equipment for building up the Yamburg field's facilities is being delayed in manufacture and shipment. The quality of the christmas trees and of many other things leaves much to be desired. And often there is not enough of even this kind of equipment.

The delivery of Yamburg gas is a great labor victory. But it could have arrived even earlier and been substantially cheaper if some supervisors had converted from mere words about restructuring to actual deeds.

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MARITIME AND RIVER FLEETS

LENINGRAD NUCLEAR VESSEL TRAINING CENTER PROBLEMS

Moscow VODNYI TRANSPORT in Russian 25 Dec 86 p 2

[Article by V. Kuznetsov, head of the Ships' Nuclear Power Plants Department of the Leningrad Higher Engineering Maritime School imeni Admiral S.O. Makarov: "It Will Pay for Itself Many Times Over"]

[Text] It fell to my lot to organize in 1958, and lead thereafter, the training of engineering personnel for atomic icebreakers at the LVIMU [Leningrad Higher Engineering Maritime School] imeni Admiral S.O. Makarov. This, by the way, is the only maritime VUZ [higher educational institution] in the country where specialists are trained specifically for operating atomic icebreakers and transport ships. Therefore, a discussion of the quality of the operating personnel's training will be undertaken below.

Until 1972, the training was carried out in the courses at regular intervals. Then a section was created at the school, in which, to this day, specialists entering the atomic fleet for the first time study in 4-month courses, and their refresher training is conducted in 2-month courses once every 5 years. In addition, when each new atomic icebreaker is being put into operation, special 2-month courses are activated for the first crew receiving the ship. During past years, the special section has completed the training of about 700 ship's mechanical engineers [inzhenery-sudomekhaniki], operators running a nuclear steam-producing plant, electromechanical engineers [inzhenery-elektromekhaniki], engineers of the automation [avtomatika] and radiation safety services, and navigational personnel.

However, it has become clear that the course system is not ensuring acceptable quality. The point is that, before being authorized for independent work, a specialist has been serving from several months to 1.5 to 2 years, depending on his specialty and personal qualities, as an apprentice on operational icebreakers. This has resulted primarily from two causes. In the first place, VIMU [Higher Engineering Maritime School] graduates have been arriving in the special section without having had any kind of VUZ background in the nuclear reactor field, so a considerable part of their time has been being spent here in studying the theoretical principles. In the second place, there have been no training mock-ups, in which, alone, it is possible to acquire practical skills in running such a complex technical system as the YaEU [nuclear power plant], in the special section.

In November 1979, in connection with the adoption of a program for expanded construction of atomic ships in the 11th 5-Year Plan, the collegium of the Minmorflot [Ministry of the Maritime Fleet] reviewed the matter of training the personnel for the ships, and decided to create a new and effective system. It is common knowledge that one who profoundly understands the physical principles of the phenomena occurring in every component of a plant, and the interdependence of these components, and has solid practical skills in servicing them, is an excellent specialist who can provide for safe and technically competent operation. In other words, a specialist should have good knowledge, both theoretical and practical. Here, both aspects have the same value--a deficiency in the one cannot be made up in the other, and vice versa.

Therefore, a strengthening of theoretical training was stipulated by the collegium. Specialization was introduced in the LVIMU's ships' mechanical and electromechanical engineering departments--"Operating Ships' Nuclear Power Plants," and "Operating the Electrical Equipment and Automatic Control and Monitoring Systems in Ships' Nuclear Power Plants"--and the "Ships' Nuclear Power Plants" Department [Kafedra] also was established.

For practical lessons, it was intended to create a maritime-shipping-industry [otraslevoy] education and training center during the 11th Five-Year Plan, equipped with an array of modern training mock-ups, at a total cost of more than 10 million rubles. To broaden their theoretical knowledge, and to implement the educational process in the industry's [otraslevoy] center, it was planned to establish a special department in 1983 for the refresher training of specialists in new future directions of the science and technology (ensuring the safe operation of atomic ships). Unfortunately, the collegium's decision has not been fully implemented as yet. The indicated specializations and the "Ships' Nuclear Power Plants" Department were created in 1980, and are functioning. But then we have not succeeded in opening the training mock-up center and the special department.

Reconstruction of the building where the special department and the training mock-up center must be accommodated has not been completed (stroytrest BMP [Baltic Shipping Company Construction Trust]). The Lengorispolkom [Leningrad Municipal Party Executive Committee] has delayed vacating the apartment house intended for the center's dormitory. The procedure of placing orders for the manufacture of training mock-ups has proved to be an extremely lengthy and complicated one. Two of these are on hand at present, and negotiations concerning their manufacture are in process for five more. Setting up of the EVM [computer] for a training mock-up of the icebreaker Rossiya was begun in the fourth quarter of the current year.

The state of affairs is such that, if the building is ready, opening of the special department and the training mock-up center's first stage will be possible at the end of 1987, or in the first half of 1988, on the basis of the mock-ups already on hand. For this, however, a set of problems associated with allocating funds for the center's support, establishing its staff by numbers and duties, and providing the center with a dormitory for its students must be fully resolved by the Minmorflot as soon as possible.

Opening the special department and training mock-up center will permit substantially improving the quality of the specialists' knowledge. However, even with the opening of the special department and the industry's [otraslevoy] education and training center, the problem of the teaching quality for the specialists cannot be considered fully resolved. There still exist many organizational and education methodology problems that must find their solutions, but this is a subject for another discussion.

It is only necessary to remember that one of the main conclusions, clear, I think, to every administrator at the present time, is this: Any efforts and expenditures to improve the training quality of specialists will pay for themselves many times over. I should like to hope that the Minmorflot's shift to full cost accounting and self-financing will facilitate resolution of the entire set of problems connected with ensuring the atomic fleet's safe operation.

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MARITIME AND RIVER FLEETS

REGIONAL PRESS ON MARITIME NAVIGATIONAL SAFETY ISSUES

Moscow VODNYI TRANSPORT in Russian 6 Jan 87 pp 1-2

[Unattributed article under the rubric "On the Pages of Basin Newspapers": "For the Safety of Marine Navigation"; first two paragraphs are boldface introduction]

[Text] The safety of marine navigation--today it is the main consideration of every maritime shipping company collective's work. The problems of radically improving it were thoroughly analyzed recently at meetings of leading management party members [partiyno-khozyaystvennyye aktivy], which took place in all basins. Maritime transport specialists, administrators of shipping companies, their party and labor union agencies, and the Minmorflot [Ministry of the Maritime Fleet], secretaries of party gorkoms [city committees], obkoms [oblast committees], and kraykoms [kray committees], and CPSU Central Committee officials participated in the work of the meetings.

These meetings were covered extensively by the basin press. Just what kinds of problems in improving the safety of navigation now worry seamen most of all?

In the basin newspapers, MORYAK [SEAMAN], ARKTICHESKAYA ZVEZDA [ARCTIC STAR], MORYAK SEVERA [SEAMAN OF THE NORTH], MORYAK BALTIKI [SEAMAN OF THE BALTIC], and others, ensuring accident-free work in maritime transport became one of the serious working aims. The main reason for this--the numerous careless mistakes in the shipping companies' work with personnel, and gross miscalculations and errors in the selection, placement, and education of officers afloat and ashore. All of this has serious consequences. The wreck of motor ship Mikhail Lermontov, the tragedy of steamship Admiral Nakhimov, the fire on motor ship Turkmeniya, and many accidents and emergency incidents on the ships of practically every shipping company are fresh in memory.

Experience shows convincingly, the newspaper MORYAK stresses, that where the people in charge delegate the problems of navigational safety to others, where they do not show adherence to principles in implementing personnel policy, and where violations of the effective technical-standards [normativno-tekhnicheskiye] documents are not prevented, negligence abounds in the safety of marine navigation matters most important for people's lives.

Are enough steps being taken locally to create normal marine navigation conditions and eliminate shortcomings in this serious business?

Participants in the meetings of leading management party members believe that bureaucratic administration, disorganization, and formalism still have not been eliminated in resolving many of the problems, despite the measures being carried out lately to ensure the fleet's accident-free operation. A good many cases of indiscipline exist. Thus, on the Black Sea motor ship Kommunist, a comprehensive check of the state of affairs in ensuring marine navigational safety was made. It showed that the crew, headed by Captain Derebin, did not realize the full scope of the tragedy that occurred in the vicinity of Novorossiysk, and had not taken steps to eliminate the violations and fulfill the requirements of the standards documents. The crew members' actions were slipshod, the officers' knowledge of the standards documents was inadequate, and performance discipline was at a low level.

By order to the shipping company, the captain, the chief mate, the second navigator, and the second engineer [mekhanik] have been punished.

Then motor ship Belorussiya was checked. There, too, serious shortcomings were discovered. After 20 days, the Belorussiya was checked again. And again it was discovered that the officers had not drawn the proper conclusions from the first check. In November, the motor ship was checked for a third time. And only after this check was it possible to reach the conclusion that the Belorussiya's officers finally were aware of the need to reform their work on marine navigational safety.

The newspaper MORYAK SEVERA also confirms that there still are quite a few instances when shipping company administration officials, fleet officers, and Communists permit violations of the requirements prescribed by regulations and the effective technical standards documents, and have a negligent attitude toward their official obligations.

Because of such an attitude toward marine navigational safety (because of accidents and emergency incidents), equipment [tekhnicheskiye] losses amounted to more than 2.1 million rubles during the 11th 5-Year Plan and part of 1986 just in the Northern Shipping Company. The shipping company's administrators are not showing the requisite strictness toward the ships' officers in matters of marine navigational safety. Many ships' and shops' party organizations of the maritime navigation service also take a liberal position in this regard.

There is hardly any reorganization in the shipping company's services and departments from the standpoint of the requirements of the April (1985) CPSU Central Committee Plenum and the resolutions of the 27th Party Congress. The ivory-tower style of management and paper creativity are being eliminated slowly. Analysis of accidents and emergency incidents is not notable for depth in the study of their causes.

MORYAK BALTIKI also writes with alarm about the high accident rate in the Baltic Shipping Company's fleet. In 1985 alone, the shipping company collective lost 1.2 million rubles because of accidents, and in 1986--already about 3.6 million. Last year, one shipwreck, three accidents, and two emergency

incidents occurred in the BMP [Baltic Shipping Company]. After the loss of motor ship Mikhail Lermontov through the fault of Captain Aleksandrov, motor ship Vyborg was thrown onto rocks, and motor ship Mekhanik Yevgrafov and the Georgiy Pyasetskiy were run aground through the fault of Captains Pavlov and Basin respectively.

The directors of the maritime navigation and ships' equipment services received appropriate evaluation of their work, but reform of their style and methods of management so far has not taken place. The navigational service is unsatisfactorily supplied on a number of ships. Deck officers [sudovoditeli] violate maritime fleet regulations and the rules of navigation [rules of the road]. Engineers [mekhaniki] permit violations of the rules for technical operation of systems and machinery. Individual officers and ordinary seamen become flustered in difficult situations, and show indecision and poor training in struggling for a ship's survival.

All of these matters have been reviewed more than once in shipping company councils and the office of the Leningrad CPSU Obkom [Oblast Committee]. And only lately have changes for the better been noticed.

Discipline, performance discipline first of all, and good organization on the job must be viewed as a state problem, writes DALNEVOSTOCHNYY MORYAK [FAR EAST SEAMAN]. But what happens in practice? In the Far East Shipping Company, they have learned to live with minor accidents and emergency incidents, material and monetary losses, mismanagement and cover-up, and they often do not wish even to mention these.

But really these are links of the same chain, which lead to disasters and bad accidents, and to enormous material damage. They seem to devote attention to matters of ensuring the safety of marine navigation in the shipping company. Nevertheless, the level of this work does not meet today's requirements. In 1986, three accidents and five emergency incidents occurred in the DVMP [Far East Shipping Company]. Violation of the technical standards documents' elementary requirements was their main cause.

The captains of ports and the port surveillance inspection offices, the teacher-captains [kapitany-nastavniki], and the teacher-engineers [mekhaniki-nastavniki] are not doing strict work to prevent the occurrence of accidents in the fleet, and are showing good-naturedness and liberalism toward violations of labor discipline, rules, and instructions for ensuring the safety of marine navigation. Voluntarily serving teacher-captains and teacher-engineers exist only on paper.

The participants in the meetings of leading management party members, which SAKHALINSKIY MORYAK [SAKHALIN SEAMAN], ARKTICHESKAYA ZVEZDA, and other basin newspapers told about, expressed serious concern over the state of the accident situation.

Many shortcomings in ensuring the fleet's accident-free operation are explained primarily by serious oversights in the selection, placement, and education of afloat-staff personnel. Thus, when promoting personnel in the Far East Shipping Company, the labor collective's opinion is hardly studied, and is not always taken into account.

In the Baltic Shipping Company, they have begun to examine the matter of captains' and first mates' suitability for the positions held, and even to disband crews, in order to stop the violations among seamen.

At one of the shipping company's partkom [party committee] sessions, the personal affairs of two captains were examined. Poor educational work, and a superficial approach and biased evaluations when promoting deck officers to responsible positions--this is primarily the fault of those shipping company and public organization administrators who are responsible for personnel selection and placement. On the average, up to 10 captains, and just as many first mates, are relieved from their positions annually in the BMP.

In the Northern Shipping Company, there so far is little that is being changed in the work with personnel. Strictness toward the fleet's officers, primarily the captains, has slackened. The shipping company's partkom has become reconciled to such a situation. A party evaluation of officers' negative actions is provided only when the officers have entirely compromised themselves. During 5 years, 20 captains and 9 first mates have been relieved from positions being held for permitted accidents, drunkenness, smuggling, and violation of customs regulations. Many of these had not been notable for exemplary conduct for a long time.

Evaluation of officers in the SMP [Northern Shipping Company] is done with violation of schedules, and often formalistically. The collective's opinion seldom is taken into account when promoting personnel. Ship captains' qualification descriptions [kharakteristiki] are not revised for years. On many ships, the principle of one-man control has become firmly established even in the work of party and social organizations. As a result of this, the captains have turned out to be beyond control and beyond criticism. Among violators of labor and production discipline, 39 percent are officer personnel.

In any shipping company, the captains constitute the collective's backbone. They personify its traditions and authority. These questions disturbed participants in the meetings of leading management party members: What should be the selection system for captains today, and how effect control over their activity and growth? Without clear and precise answers to them, the problems facing the shipping companies cannot be successfully resolved.

Not every graduate of a maritime educational institution who has received a deck officer's diploma meets, in his moral and psychological qualities, those demands that are made upon a captain. Therefore, it is necessary to develop such methods and system as will permit objectively evaluating a man's potentials, and rule out errors in determining his professional qualifications.

Thus, in the Black Sea Shipping Company, the reserve for promotion to captain is unrealistic because of the lack of selection methods and system. During the years 1981-1986, 105 captains were relieved from positions there and dismissed from the shipping company. Lost were 105 specialists, on whose training the state and the shipping company had expended considerable funds.

Work to create a capable reserve of captains in the ChMP [Black Sea Shipping Company] must be organized immediately, inasmuch as a reserve numbering only 38 persons has been selected for 460 captains' positions.

The institute for teachers [nastavniki] (teacher-captains and teacher-engineers) is called upon to play an enormous role in the matter of improving personnel work and ensuring the safety of marine navigation. In selecting and placing this category of officials, and in organizing their work, a well-considered system is essential. It is necessary to effect continuous control over the teachers' professional growth and their work methods.

Highly principled people having authority must work at this. It is necessary to improve the work of the personnel departments. A paper flood still is concealing the real issue from their workers. For all practical purposes, they make decisions about promoting people to a job, not by occupational skills, but on the basis of paper representations. Often the content of his qualification descriptions does not correspond to the occupational skills and moral character of a seaman. And no one bears responsibility for an untrue qualification description. Frequently, in handing out a favorable evaluation, someone is trying to get rid of a negligent person in that way. And for this reason, randomly selected individuals are turning up in responsible leadership positions.

At the meetings of leading management party members, the condition of ships, engines, and the equipment of these was analyzed in detail as one of the serious causes of accident occurrence in the fleet. Serious oversights and reserves were uncovered in the work of ship repair enterprises and various services engaged in servicing the fleet, providing for navigational safety, and so forth. The proposals introduced, and the analysis made of shortcomings and unused reserves formed the basis of plans of action in every shipping company. These are aimed at increasing the safety of marine navigation, and at improving all work of the afloat staff, the shore services, the maritime fleet's party organizations, and other public agencies in the matter of educating seamen and creating the requisite conditions for their working and living.

The meetings of leading management party members showed that the maritime fleet's collectives have firmly decided to eradicate their oversights and shortcomings as the resolutions of the April (1985) CPSU Central Committee Plenum and the 27th Party Congress demand.

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
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MARITIME AND RIVER FLEETS

AKADEMIK FEDOROV SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH SHIP PROFILED

Moscow MORSKOY FLOT in Russian No 11, Nov 86 pp 60-62

[Article by Yu. Andryushin and D. Solostyanskiy of the Arctic and Antarctic Scientific Research Institute in the section "Maritime Transport Technology":
"The Akademik Fedorov: A New Addition to the Fleet"]



The Akademik Fedorov [Academician Fedorov]

[Text] In 1987, the Finnish firm "RAUMA-Repola" should complete construction of the scientific-expedition ship Akademik Fedorov, intended for carrying freight and wintering personnel to Soviet antarctic stations, and for conducting scientific research work in the Antarctic.

The ship is designed for USSR Registry class KM(*)ULA(2)A2 (research) [In the class designation, "(*)" is an encircled star, and "(2)" is a boxed numeral 2].

Basic Features

Length

Greatest	141.2 meters [about 463.3 feet]
Between perpendiculars [at water line] ...	128.6 meters [about 421.8 feet]
Beam	23.5 meters [about 77.1 feet]
Height of side	13.3 meters [about 43.6 feet]
Draft at summer load line	8.5 meters [about 27.9 feet]
Deadweight at 8.5-meter draft	7,600 metric tons
Speed	16 knots
Cruising self-sufficiency	80 days

The ship is capable of proceeding with uninterrupted headway at a speed of 2 knots in flat, unbroken ice about 1 meter thick. "Reapoks-LV" paint, which reduces hull friction in ice and inhibits hull coverage with ice and wet snow, will promote improvement of her speed in ice as well.

The Akademik Fedorov is a single-screw, three-deck ship with a six-level superstructure amidships and a forecastle. The hull is all-welded. The sides and decks, except the main deck, are put together by the transverse framing system, and the bottom and main deck by the longitudinal. Every third shell-plating stiffener [shpangout] is a frame member. The outer shell plating and the framing are made mainly of high-strength alloy steel. Within the ice belt, the shell plating is thickened and reinforced with between-frame stiffeners [promezhutochnyye shpangouty] along the ship's entire length, in accordance with USSR Registry requirements for category ULA [not further identified] ice strengthening. A four-bladed, fixed-pitch screw propeller of 5.1-meter diameter, made of stainless steel and having detachable blades, serves as propulsion device.

The ship's cargo-handling equipment includes two ("Khegglund") Firm electric-hydraulic cranes of 50-metric-ton lift capacity each, and two of 10-metric-ton lift capacity each, with a 25-meter maximum sweep of booms. An electric-hydraulic crane-gangplank [kran-skhodnya], having a 2-metric-ton lift capacity at a sweep of 20 meters, is installed on the forecastle. Its folding, two-section boom is used either as a crane boom with a 20-meter sweep or, at its full length of 36 meters, as a gangplank to provide for people's going out onto the ice or an obstacle.

The ship has two holds with 'tween-deck spaces for carrying equipment and general cargo. The depth of the holds and 'tween-deck spaces is about 6 meters. In addition, there is a hold for carrying fuel and lubricant materials in drums, and a refrigerated hold for the antarctic stations' food supplies. All closures of the holds and 'tween-deck spaces are hydraulic. There is a hold for scientific equipment.

Some of the ballast tanks are equipped with a system for carrying up to 1,900 metric tons of diesel fuel. All of the fuel tanks, the forward and after peak tanks, and the other ballast tanks that are located partially above the water line, have a preheating system.

For transporting cargo from the ship to an unequipped shore, there is a helicopter platform, measuring 23 X 23 meters, suitable for Mi-8 [Mil-8] and Ka-32 [Kamov-32] helicopters. The helicopters are kept in a hangar measuring 21 X 6 X 6 meters, and on the helicopter platform. Special winches move a helicopter from the platform to the hangar and back. The helicopters can carry out ice reconnaissance in addition to cargo operations.

For transporting by water, there are two work launches [katera] of 20- and 30-metric-ton load capacity. The launches are made of a light alloy, and are equipped with a ramp, a loading crane [or hoist], and a heated wheelhouse.

For cargo-transfer operations on the ice and on land, there are two light tractors on the ship, a "Terri-1020" and a "Valmet," with tracked trailers and a manipulator crane of 1-metric-ton lift capacity.

Two of the "Rauma-Repola" Firm's automatic mooring winches, with a maximum pulling force of 120 kilonewtons [kN], are located at both the bow and the stern.

The anchoring equipment [ground tackle] consists of three (Khol) anchors, including the spare, weighing 4,890 kilograms each, hawsepipes with a washing system, and two windlass attachments [wildcats] with electric drives and band brakes. In addition to the master control on the forecastle deck, control of the equipment can be effected from the pilothouse, with remote control of the length of chain paid out. The anchoring and mooring equipment meets the requirements of the rules for navigation in the Suez, Kiel, and Panama Canals.

The lifesaving equipment consists of two glass-fiber-reinforced plastic motorboats of the enclosed "Fiskars-382" type, each for 100 persons, two "Reskyu-" ["Rescue-"] type boats, each for 25 persons, and seven lifesaving rafts.

An "Intering-" type system [not further identified], which also is a system for damping the ship's oscillatory motions and adjusting her trim, serves to free the ship from sticking in ice. The forward and after peak ballast tanks serve as a trimming system for the same purpose, with pumps for the transfer of ballast between them at a delivery rate of 1,000 cubic meters per hour each.

The living and public spaces have modern appointments, and are equipped with air conditioners.

The ship's crew consists of 90 persons, including the scientific-technical staff. It is quartered in 38 single and 26 double staterooms. In addition, there are 40 double staterooms with 2 extra pullman-type berths for transporting 160 wintering personnel of the antarctic expedition. A sick bay, an operating room, an outpatient-clinic complex, an isolation ward, and an X-ray room go into the medical block. There are two saunas, a gymnasium [sportzal], a library, and a photographic laboratory on the ship.

The scientific complex includes various laboratories and deck equipment. Hydrographic [gidrologicheskoye] equipment is installed on the first superstructure deck at the stern: two line winches, each with a pulling force of 20 kilonewtons (at a speed of 1.1 meters per second); two electric-cable and line winches, each with a pulling force of 30 kilonewtons (at 1.3 meters per second); two line winches with a pulling force of about 60 kilonewtons (at 1.1 meters per second); and a line winch with a pulling force of 15 kilonewtons (at 1.1 meters per second). All winches are automatic, with hydraulic motors. In addition to the stationary control panels, there also is a portable panel, which may be connected to any hydrographic winch.

There are four overhead traveling hoists [kran-balki] to the hydraulic winches on the first superstructure deck at the stern, and a rectangular frame open at the bottom [Russian P-shaped] with a hydraulic drive, which can be used for placing oceanographic [okeanologicheskoye] buoy stations. Two light booms with a sweep of about 5 meters, which pivot to 90 degrees over the side with meteorological gauges, are mounted along the sides on the bearing-taking [pelengatornaya] deck.

In the hydrographic laboratory, there are a sounding bathometer with a 6,000-meter submersion depth, a "Gidrozon M-6000" ["Hydrosonde M-6000"] set, an automatic buoy-type wave recorder, and an ATsIT-40D self-contained digital current meter with data processing unit.

The water chemistry laboratory is equipped with a polarograph, a gas chromatograph with a data processing station, a spectrophotometer, a radiometer, an apparatus for bidistillation, an oil analyzer, a salinometer, and a photoelectric colorimeter.

In the cold ice-research laboratory, there is a device for compression and flex testing samples of ice under natural conditions; and in the hydrobiology laboratory--an incubator, a gas chromatograph, and infrared and atomic absorption spectrophotometers. An automated weather station is installed in the meteorology laboratory. Television monitors, showing all meteorological data, repeat the readings in the hydrographic, water chemistry, and synoptic spaces, and in the radiosynoptic laboratory.

The radiosynoptic laboratory is equipped with a system for receiving data from meteorological artificial earth satellites, and with a visual display of the satellite navigation system. In the aerologic laboratory, an automated station is installed for measuring the temperature, speed, and direction of wind, the pressure, etc., in the upper layers of the atmosphere with the aid of radiosondes; and in the sounding laboratory--navigational and deep-water echo sounders, and a sonar system.

The computer system consists of the central and laboratory computers [EVM's], connected to laboratory data collecting and processing equipment. All laboratories are linked by looped [koltsevyye] communication lines.

There is a diving station on the ship, equipped with an air-distribution panel, communication devices, and a power supply panel, intended for the simultaneous descent and underwater work at a depth as great as 12 meters of two divers in heavy diving suits. There is an underwater telephone system [teleustanovka], and a complete set of equipment for underwater welding, cutting, and repair work. A special boatswain's chair, lowered at the stern by a hydrographic winch, provides for the divers' descent.

As propulsion system, a diesel-electric one was selected, with a common [yedinaya] power system and a fixed-pitch screw propeller. A transverse maneuvering thruster [podrulivayushcheye ustroystvo] of 1.3-megawatt power, with an adjustable-pitch screw propeller, is mounted in the bow. In the stern, there is a maneuvering thruster creating both transverse and longitudinal thrust, which provides for the ship's forward movement with a speed of 4 knots.

The main power plant consists of four diesel engines of the "Vyartsilya" Firm's VAZA-32 type connected to ("Stroemberg") Firm generators. Two VAZA 16V32D diesel engines, each of 6-megawatt power, are connected to HSPOL 18/754 synchronous, brushless generators of 5,775-kilowatt power at a voltage of 6,300 volts and a rotation rate of 750 revolutions per minute. Two VAZA 6R32D diesel engines, each of 2,250-kilowatt power, are connected to HSPOL 12/954 synchronous, brushless generators of 2,100-kilowatt power at a voltage of 6,300 volts and a rotation rate of 750 revolutions per minute. The generators have a closed system of cooling air circulation. The diesel engines run on heavy fuel of 180-centistokes viscosity at 50 degrees Celsius.

The propeller and two-anchor direct-current electric motor of type 2 MP 17600-130 OMZ has a voltage of 1,000 volts at a rotation rate of 130/160 revolutions per minute. Both anchors are powered separately from its 12-pulsed thyristor rectifiers, each of 7,400-kilowatt power at a voltage of 1,000 volts. Each rectifier consists of two series-connected, 6-pulsed, out-of-phase rectifiers. Power is transmitted from the generators to the rectifiers through four enclosed, air-cooled, three-phase transformers of 5,100-kilovolt-ampere capacity with a voltage of 6,300/450 volts.

The propeller's electrical system is designed for a nominal power of 2 X 6,000 kilowatts, but can operate for a long time at a power of 2 X 7,000 kilowatts when overcoming heavy ice barriers [peremychki].

Control of the power plant is effected from three pilothouse stations and the TsPU [central control panel] through the ("Stroemberg") Firm's "Selma-2" system. A distinctive feature of this system is its capacity for not permitting overloads of the main generators under operating conditions (except for cases of the screw's becoming stuck in ice).

The ship's general electrical equipment receives power from the main distribution panel at a voltage of 400 volts, but the scientific equipment and all of the computers [EVM's]--from a distribution panel for a constantly stabilized voltage of 220 volts. In the operating mode, the main distribution panel is

supplied with electric power from two transformers of 1,600-kilovolt-ampere capacity at a voltage of 6,300/400 volts, and, when moored in port--from three at-moorage diesel generators of 330-kilovolt-ampere capacity at a voltage of 400 volts. The emergency distribution panel receives power from a type ADGR 200/1500 emergency diesel generator of 250-kilovolt-ampere capacity at a voltage of 400 volts.

Two vertical [upright] water-tube boilers with an output of 6 metric tons of saturated steam per hour at an operating pressure of 700 kilopascals [kPa] meet the steam requirements. The boilers' burners work entirely in the automatic mode after starting. In addition, there are four water-tube utility boilers with the steam outputs 2 X 2 metric tons per hour and 2 X 0.9 metric tons per hour at an operating pressure of 700 kilopascals. There is a system for magnetic treatment of boiler water.

The entire power system and the ballast, fuel, and pumping systems are monitored by a metering-data [informatsionno-izmeritelnaya] and control system of Finnish manufacture. Data on the power system's condition go to the central control panel and the pilothouse. When the ship is moored in port, a generalized signal also goes to the staterooms of the chief and watch engineers [mekhaniki], to the officers' mess, and to the bridge.

The ship's construction and equipment fully meet the requirements of International Convention MARPOL-73/78 [not further identified]. The capability of incinerating waste oils in an oil-burning boiler is provided. There are two water-distilling plants on the ship, which supply distilled water to a common drinking-water system. The sanitary [flushing] system is of the vacuum type.

The ship is provided with the necessary radio communication and electronic navigation equipment, mainly of Soviet manufacture.

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